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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 14, 2016, a self-driving vehicle sensed sandbags positioned
around a storm drain and maneuvered to avoid them, crossing into the center
* © 2017 Michelle Sellwood.  J.D. Candidate 2018, University of San Diego School
of Law.
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lane and crashing into the side of a public transit bus.1  This was the first 
crash caused by a self-driving vehicle, proving that even with all the cameras,
lasers, radars, sonars, and global positioning systems (GPS), car accidents are
inevitable.2  This inevitability was magnified on May 7, 2016, when a 
tractor-trailer turned in front of a self-driving vehicle, and the vehicle 
failed to brake, resulting in the first self-driving vehicle fatality.3  Currently,
there are no standards for who should be held liable in situations such as these
involving fully autonomous vehicles; this is because there is no driver at fault. 
Instead, artificial intelligence (AI) operates the vehicle.  Society has progressed
from the “horse and buggy” to trains, planes, and automobiles, and the 
creation of autonomous robots, such as the driverless car, is a new progression
in this line of advancements.  This Comment poses the question, “Should an
autonomous robot possess a legal status in society?” and answers that question
in the affirmative, thereby holding the autonomous vehicle liable. 
Driverless cars are the first step in innovation to a fully autonomous future. 
But as technology evolves, the law must evolve with it.  For instance, in
1905, all cases dealing with automobile tort liability could be summarized in
a four-page article, whereas by 1936, it would “call for an encyclopedia.”4  This
 1. DMV, REPORT OF TRAFFIC ACCIDENT INVOLVING AN AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE 2 
(2016), https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/wcm/connect/3946fbb8-e04e-4d52-8f80-b33948df34b2/
Google+Auto+LLC+02.14.16.pdf?MOD=AJPERES [https://perma.cc/7TP3-TAWQ].
2. See Alex Davies, Google’s Self-Driving Car Caused Its First Crash, WIRED
(Feb. 29, 2016, 2:04 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/02/googles-self-driving-car-may­
caused-first-crash/ [https://perma.cc/7456-GP7B].
3. The Tesla Team, A Tragic Loss, TESLA (June 30, 2016), https://www.tesla.com/ 
blog/tragic-loss [https://perma.cc/E3NS-XPZ3]; see also Bill Vlasic & Neal E. Boudette,
Self-Driving Tesla Was Involved in Fatal Crash, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/01/business/self-driving-tesla-fatal-crash-investigation.html.
Following the death of the vehicle operator, Joshua Brown, Tesla released a statement saying
the car’s Autopilot (semi-autonomous self-driving feature) was unable to see “the white
side of the tractor trailer against a brightly lit sky.” A Tragic Loss, supra.  Tesla also noted 
that because it was a semi-autonomous system, the operator should have taken control of 
the vehicle. Id.  The investigation into the crash revealed that there were no “defects in 
design or performance of the . . . Autopilot systems,” clearing Tesla of fault. NAT’L HIGHWAY
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., INVESTIGATION PE 16-007, at 11 (2017), 
https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2016/INCLA-PE16007-7876.PDF [https://perma.cc/YD5N- 
L7YL].  Tesla, however, did release an update that Elon Musk believed would have likely
prevented the crash because it included revisions to the driver monitoring strategy. Neal
E. Boudette, Elon Musk Says Pending Tesla Updates Could Have Prevented Fatal Crash, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/12/business/elon-musk­
says-pending-tesla-updates-could-have-prevented-fatal-crash.html.  In a fully autonomous
vehicle, this would not have been a straightforward investigation because the “driver” is 
the AI system, and the human passenger cannot take control of the vehicle. See FEDERAL
AUTOMATED VEHICLES POLICY, infra note 54, at 9. 
4. Richard M. Nixon, Comment, Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile Accident
Litigation, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 476, 476 (1936).  This 1936 law review article was 
authored by former United States President Richard M. Nixon while he studied law at
830
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was due to the courts’ insistence on extending old laws “developed in the 
days of the horse and buggy” to modern automobile cases.5  However,
some courts were willing to establish new doctrines by “stretch[ing] the
legal formulas . . . to reach desired results.”6  These “stretches” created 
products liability law; however, the law developed slowly, while the rigid
horse and buggy rules continued to govern automobile liability for decades.7 
As such, the law was essentially outpaced by technology.  Likewise, the 
adoption of the driverless car will place society at a similar crossroads. 
Current state and federal laws assume human beings make all the decisions.8 
Yet, as autonomy advances, it will demand changes to these laws because 
the AI will have a role in making every day driving decisions.  As a result,
autonomous robots will no longer be considered products used by society,
instead they will become part of society.  For the law and driverless cars to 
develop in tandem, lawmakers need to be proactive in addressing autonomous
liability.
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) took a 
groundbreaking step in February 2016 by recognizing the AI system
Duke University. Id.  After law school, Nixon served in World War II as a Navy lieutenant
commander in the Pacific, and after leaving the Navy, he was elected to Congress. FRANK
FREIDEL & HUGH SIDEY, THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 79 (16th 
ed. 2001). Two years later, General Eisenhower selected Nixon as his running mate.  Id.
Following Nixon’s vice presidency in the Eisenhower administration, and one unsuccessful run
for president in 1969, Nixon was elected as the 37th President of the United States.  Id.
However, when faced with the prospect of impeachment after the Watergate scandal,
Nixon became the only president in American history to resign from office. Id.; cf. Nixon
v. United States, 418 U.S. 683, 713, 715–16 (1974) (holding that the president does not 
have absolute immunity in a criminal proceeding for official executive communications).
5. Nixon, supra note 4, at 476. 
6. Id. at 485.  An example of this is courts’ refusal to “classify the automobile as
a dangerous instrumentality,” thereby refusing to “hold the owner liable.”  Id. However, by
applying more conventional formulas, courts have recognized that an automobile “may
become dangerous unless carefully driven.  Therefore, the owner may subject himself to liability 
if he knowingly entrusts his car to a driver who is incompetent for want of age or experience, 
or who has a reputation for recklessness.”  Id. (footnotes omitted) (first citing Allen v. Bland,
168 S.W. 35 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914); then citing Jones v. Harris, 210 P. 22 (Wash. 1922)). 
7. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 249 (3d ed. 2015) (“Over the first 
half of the twentieth century, tort law moved slowly in expanding a manufacturer’s responsibility
for product-caused harm to remote consumers.”); see Nixon, supra note 4, at 476. 
8. JOHN FRANK WEAVER, ROBOTS ARE PEOPLE TOO: HOW SIRI, GOOGLE CAR, AND
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE WILL FORCE US TO CHANGE OUR LAWS 4 (2014). 
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piloting Google’s self-driving cars as the driver.9  This recognition once again
stretches legal formulas, paving the way to a category of law that is willing 
to recognize this fully autonomous robot as a legal entity—an artificial 
person. 
Part II of this Comment discusses the background of AI and robotics, 
the technology behind the autonomous vehicle, and the evolution of products 
liability laws. Part III examines current regulations, the benefits of autonomous 
technology, and the need for a definitive liability framework.  Part IV 
discusses why current tort liability laws will be ineffective in governing
autonomous vehicle liability by examining the shift in liability from the 
driver to the owner and manufacturer. Part V proposes a short-term solution 
by attributing liability to the programmer, while software is still hard-
coded. Finally, Part VI explores legal personhood, and proposes that the 
autonomous vehicle be held liable through a similar legal structure to that 
of a corporation.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Understanding the Technology: AI and Robotics 
In 1950, Alan Turing proposed the question, “Can machines think?”10 
Turing, widely regarded as the father of AI, replaced this question with a 
practical test, which he termed the “Imitation Game.”11  The test requires
9. Letter from Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, Chief Counsel, Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety
Admin., to Chris Urmson, Dir. of the Self-Driving Car Project, Google (Feb. 4, 2016), 
http://tiny.cc/ke8pjy [https://perma.cc/J4N9-2Z8Q]. 
10. A.M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 MIND 433, 433 (1950). 
11. Id. Turing’s life story was adapted into the Oscar-winning screenplay, The Imitation
Game, by Graham Moore. The Imitation Game, CUMBERBATCHWEB, http://www.benedictcumber
batch.co.uk/film/the-imitation-game/ [https://perma.cc/96PV-54TP].  The film, starring
Benedict Cumberbatch, was released theatrically in 2014.  Id.  It follows Turing from his 
school days through to World War II, where he helped to end the war by building the first 
computer to crack the Nazi enigma codes, ending with his prosecution in 1952 under
Britain’s “gross indecency” law for homosexuality. The Imitation Game, GRAHAM MOORE, 
https://mrgrahammoore.com/film-tv/the-imitation-game/ [https://perma.cc/8389-K2EU].
The press surrounding the film encouraged the posthumous pardoning of Alan Turing in 
2013 by Queen Elizabeth II and the creation of a worldwide petition requesting the pardoning
of the other 49,000 men prosecuted under this law.  Steven Swinford, Alan Turing Granted 
Royal Pardon by the Queen, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 24, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://www.telegraph. 
co.uk/history/world-war-two/10536246/Alan-Turing-granted-Royal-pardon-by-the­
Queen.html; Sarah Kaplan, Inspired by ‘Imitation Game,’ Petition Calls for Pardon of 
49,000 British Men Prosecuted for Being Gay, WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 23, 2015), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/02/23/inspired-by-imitation-game­
petition-calls-for-pardon-of-49000-british-men-prosecuted-for-being-gay/?utm_term=.98553 
6b7f57c [https://perma.cc/77MZ-GC2S]. In 2017, Turing’s Law was enacted to posthumously
pardon all the men convicted under British homosexuality laws.  Kate McCann, Turing’s 
Law: Oscar Wilde Among 50,000 Convicted Gay Men Granted Posthumous Pardons, 
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that a human interrogator ask a series of questions, via text, to a human 
participant and to a computer designed to generate human-like responses, 
with the goal of determining which of the participants is the computer and
which is the human.12  The test ultimately assesses whether a machine can 
be smart enough to fool a person into thinking that they are communicating 
with another person.13  These natural language conversations were one of
the first steps in testing whether machines can exhibit intelligent behavior.14 
Nowadays, this intelligent behavior is commonly referred to as AI.15 
The term AI was first used by John McCarthy in his 1955 proposal for the
Dartmouth Summer Research Project to define the “science and engineering 
of making intelligent machines.”16  Although the term created a unified
TELEGRAPH (Jan. 31, 2017, 8:16 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/31/turings­
law-thousands-convicted-gay-bisexual-men-receive-posthumous/ [https://perma.cc/QD2M- LZ6R].
12. See Turing, supra note 10, at 433–35.  Turing begins by describing a party game 
where player A is male, player B is female, and player C is the interrogator whose goal is
to determine the gender of player A and B. Id.  Turing then modifies that game by posing 
the question, “[w]hat will happen when a machine takes the part of A in this game?” Id.
 13. See id. Different versions of this test have developed through the years, including a
version where a jury asks questions of a computer, and the computer must make a significant 
portion of the jury believe that it is a human.  MICHAEL RYAN, THE DIGITAL MIND: AN 
EXPLORATION OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 131 (2014). These intelligence tests are widely
referred to as the “Turing Test.” Id.
14. In 2014, the first computer program, named Eugene Goostman, passed the Turing
Test. Turing Test Success Marks Milestone in Computing History, U. READING (June 8,
2014), http://www.reading.ac.uk/news-and-events/releases/PR583836.aspx [https://perma.cc/ 
SA9D-EDNC].  To pass the test, the interrogator must mistake the computer for a human 
more than 30% of the time. Id.  Eugene, simulating a thirteen-year-old boy, convinced 33% of
the interrogators that it was human. Id.
 15. Tim Urban, The AI Revolution: The Road to Superintelligence, WAIT BUT WHY
(Jan. 22, 2015), http://waitbutwhy.com/2015/01/artificial-intelligence-revolution-1.html
[https://perma.cc/F5LA-47W9].  AI is depicted throughout novels, comic books, movies, 
and television shows.  Examples of some of the most famous AI include: HAL 9000 from 
2001: A Space Odyssey; Agent Smith from The Matrix Trilogy; C-3PO and R2-D2 from 
Star Wars; Data from Star Trek; Skynet from The Terminator; Wall-E and Auto from 
Pixar’s Wall-E; Rosey from The Jetsons; and the most recent additions, Dolores and Maeve
from Westworld, to name a few. See 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer 
1968); Star Trek: The Next Generation: Encounter at Farpoint (CBS television broadcast 
Sept. 28, 1987); STAR WARS: EPISODE IV – A NEW HOPE (Lucasfilm Ltd. 1977); The Jetsons: 
Rosey the Robot (ABC broadcast Sept. 23, 1962); THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. 1999); THE 
TERMINATOR (Hemdale Film Corp. 1984); WALL-E (Walt Disney Pictures & Pixar Animation 
Studios 2008); Westworld: The Original (HBO broadcast Oct. 2, 2016). 
16. What Is Artificial Intelligence, AISB, http://www.aisb.org.uk/public-engagement/
what-is-ai [https://perma.cc/J6EJ-2J93]; see also John McCarthy et al., A Proposal for the 
Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence, AI MAG., Aug. 31, 1955, 
at 13, http://www.aaai.org/ojs/index.php/aimagazine/article/view/1904/1802 (displaying
 833
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identity for AI, three categories have emerged to define the level of machine 
intelligence: (1) Artificial Narrow Intelligence, (2) Artificial General Intelligence,
and (3) Artificial Superintelligence.17  While the primary goal in artificial
intelligence research is to develop Artificial General Intelligence, which 
is human-level intelligence, the world is currently made up of Artificial Narrow
Intelligence.18  This is AI that specializes in one area, focusing on a narrow
the first page of the original Dartmouth proposal, which introduces the term “Artificial
Intelligence”).  In 1958, McCarthy created Lisp, “which became the standard AI programming
language and continues to be used today, not only in robotics and other scientific applications
but in a plethora of internet-based services, from credit-card fraud detection to airline
scheduling; it also paved the way for voice recognition technology, including Siri.”  Martin
Childs, John McCarthy: Computer Scientist Known as the Father of AI, INDEP. (Nov. 1, 
2011), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/john-mccarthy-computer-scientist­
known-as-the-father-of-ai-6255307.html [https://perma.cc/ZX9Y-YZ34].  McCarthy won 
the Turing Award in 1971 for his contributions to the field of AI.  A.M. Turing Award:
John McCarthy, ASS’N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY, http://amturing.acm.org/award_winners/
mccarthy_1118322.cfm [https://perma.cc/7T8M-AYSN].
17. Urban, supra note 15.
 18. RYAN, supra note 13, at 7–8. Traits associated with Artificial General Intelligence 
include “consciousness, sentience, sapience, and [the] self-awareness observed in living
beings.” Id. at 9. Although the creation of Artificial General Intelligence remains a
common theme in science fiction films, it inevitably morphs into the villainous Artificial
Superintelligence.  See, e.g., 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY, supra note 15 (introducing HAL
9000). This is the type of intelligence that surpasses the smartest human minds, inciting
the fear that humans will one day be superseded by their creations.  See Nick Bostrom,
How Long Before Superintelligence?, NICK BOSTROM: BLOG (Mar. 12, 2008), http://www.
nickbostrom.com/superintelligence.html [https://perma.cc/WYX9-X7DB].  One of the ultimate 
AI villains is HAL 9000, whose unnerving phrase, “I’m sorry Dave, I’m afraid I can’t do 
that,” perfectly encapsulates the fear that humans will one day have no control over their
creations. See 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY, supra note 15.  Leaders in the field of AI have 
postulated that once we have Artificial General Intelligence, superintelligence is not far 
behind, because the AIs with general intelligence will construct better AIs, which in turn
will build even better AIs; this cycle will result in an “intelligence explosion.” Irving John
Good, Speculations Concerning the First Ultraintelligent Machine, in 6 ADVANCES IN
COMPUTERS 31, 33 (Franz L. Alt & Morris Rubinoff eds., 1965). Futurist Ray Kurzweil 
refers to this as the “Singularity,” and predicts it will occur by 2045. RAY KURZWEIL, THE 
SINGULARITY IS NEAR: WHEN HUMANS TRANSCEND BIOLOGY 136 (2005). If Kurzweil’s 
prediction is correct, Artificial General Intelligence is anticipated within the next thirty
years. See id.  However, there are differing opinions as to whether machines will ever truly
gain consciousness.  See, e.g., Bobby Azarian, The Myth of Sentient Machines, PSYCHOL.
TODAY (June 1, 2016), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/mind-in-the-machine/201606/
the-myth-sentient-machines [https://perma.cc/X3P7-WBFZ].  Although Singularity advocates,
like Kurzweil, believe it is possible to reverse engineer the human brain, critics like
neuroscientist Miguel Nicolelis differentiate between intelligence and consciousness, 
believing that intelligence can be replicated but consciousness cannot.  See RAY KURZWEIL,
HOW TO CREATE A MIND: THE SECRET OF HUMAN THOUGHT REVEALED 280 (2012); Antonio 
Regalado, The Brain Is Not Computable, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 18, 2013), https://www. 
technologyreview.com/s/511421/the-brain-is-not-computable/ [https://perma.cc/A99X-2LQ8].
This is because, from an engineering standpoint, “[a]ll digital computers are binary systems”
that function using ones and zeroes to represent things like “numbers, letters, colors, shapes,
834
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task.19  For example, Apple’s Siri and Microsoft’s Cortana are essentially 
virtual personal assistants that can answer questions through their ability to
process large amounts of data.20  These AI systems are highly intelligent, 
but they operate in a predefined manner and are unable to complete tasks
outside of their field of intelligence.21 
Another area of AI research is robotics.22 Although the terms AI and robot
are often used interchangeably, there is a difference.  AI is software that can
learn and self-improve, whereas a robot is a machine that can be semi-
images, and even audio.” Azarian, supra. Therefore, “[e]verything a computer does involves
manipulating [these] two symbols in some way.” Id. However, computers, unlike the human
brain, “only recognize [the] symbols and not the meaning of those symbols.” Id. (emphasis 
added).  By attaching no meaning to an image or a sound, computers cannot “experience 
the world subjectively,” and thus, critics believe they will never be conscious. Id.
 19. See Urban, supra note 15. 
20. See Tom Warren, The Story of Cortana, Microsoft’s Siri Killer, VERGE (Apr. 2,
2014, 2:00 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/4/2/5570866/cortana-windows-phone-8­
1-digital-assistant [https://perma.cc/HD6V-WJEZ]. Microsoft named the AI in its windows 
phone after “Cortana,” the AI character in its video game Halo.  Ray Kurzweil, Windows 
Phone Digital Assistant Cortana, Based on Popular AI Character from Halo Video Game,
KURZWEIL ACCELERATING INTELLIGENCE (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.kurzweilai.net/
microsoft-windows-phone-digital-assistant-cortana-based-on-popular-smart-ai-character­
from-halo-video-game [https://perma.cc/E5V6-HER5]. In the Halo series, “Cortana is a 
powerful artificial intelligence with human-level capabilities.” Id. To bring Cortana to 
life, Microsoft worked closely with Jen Taylor, the voice of Cortana in the Halo series, to 
create the voice of Cortana in its Windows phone.  Warren, supra.
21. See RYAN,supra note 13, at 7; see also Urban, supra note 15 (explaining that Artificial 
Narrow Intelligence is “AI that can beat the world chess champion in chess, but . . . [a]sk 
it to figure out a better way to store data on a hard drive, and it’ll look at you blankly”). 
22. The term robot was first introduced to the English language by the 1921 Karel 
Čapek play R.U.R (Rossum’s Universal Robots), where it was used to describe an artificial 
man-like machine—a humanoid. See KAREL ČAPEK, R.U.R (ROSSUM’S UNIVERSAL ROBOTS)
32, 37 (Claudia Novack trans., Penguin Books 2004) (1921).  Robot comes from the Czech 
word robota, meaning servitude or forced labor, and Rossum’s robots are portrayed as being 
“[d]evoid of emotion, personality and thus agency.”  Daven Hiskey, Where Does the Word
Robot Come From?, TODAY I FOUND OUT (May 11, 2012), http://www.todayifoundout.com/
index.php/2012/05/where-does-the-word-robot-come-from/ [https://perma.cc/CGV2-97MB]
(stating that Roboti traces its roots from the Old Church Slavanic word rabota, “meaning 
‘servitude’, which in turn comes from rabu, meaning ‘slave’”); Zachary McCune, R.U.R. 
- Literary Origins of Robots & the Threat of Post-Humanity, CYBERPUNK (Apr. 26, 2009), 
http://thames2thayer.com/cyberpunk/?p=65. Čapek’s play aptly examines the master-
servant relationship, turning it on its head when the humanoid work force is given souls, 
“mak[ing] the robots ‘aware’ of . . . their rights to agency not slavery.”  McCune, supra. The 
robots’ newfound self-awareness incites a robot revolution against their human masters, 
resulting in the near extermination of the human race. ČAPEK, surpa, at 48. At the end of the 
play, however, two robots develop human emotions and fall in love, which illustrates a 
hybridization of man and machine, thereby becoming the image of the future. See id. at 84. 
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autonomous or fully-autonomous.23  In other words, “AI is the brain, and the
robot is its body.”24 Autonomy, on the other hand, has to do with control.25 
An autonomous robot is self-governing and can act independently of 
external commands.26  One key factor in autonomy is that the robot has a 
choice in behavior; however, if that choice can be overridden by an external
agency—like a human driver—then the robot is only semi-autonomous.27 
B. The Autonomous Vehicle 
In integrating automation and AI, advancements in the robotics industry
have led to highly intelligent autonomous robots, such as the autonomous
vehicle.28  These are self-driving vehicles that do not require the “active 
physical control or monitoring” of a human operator;29 the vehicle makes 
all major driving decisions, and as such, is set to revolutionize both the 
transportation industry and the laws governing it.30 These vehicles operate
using a “sense-plan-act” design.31  They are equipped with (1) sensors,
GPS, and inertial navigation systems to map the surrounding environment 
and track the vehicle’s course; (2) radars to detect and avoid obstacles; (3) 
23. “[T]he degree of autonomy of movement in a robot can range from fully autonomous, 
to semi-autonomous, to non-autonomous, depending upon the extent to which the robot 
controls its own activity.”  Harry Surden & Mary-Anne Williams, Technological Opacity, 
Predictability, and Self-Driving Cars, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 173 (2016). 
24. Urban, supra note 15. 
25. Autonomy derives from the Greek words, “autos (‘self,’) and nomos (‘law’).” Jenay
M. Beer et al., Toward a Framework for Levels of Robot Autonomy in Human-Robot Interaction, 
3 J. HUM.-ROBOT INTERACTION 74, 74 (2014).
26. See Jeffrey O. Kephart & David M. Chess, The Vision of Autonomic Computing, 
36 COMPUTER 41, 42 (2003) (“The essence of autonomic computing systems is self-
management . . . .”); Surden & Williams, supra note 23, at 131 (“[E]ngineers apply the 
term ‘autonomous’ to computer controlled systems that make important choices about their 
own actions with little or no human intervention.”).
27. See J.P. Gunderson & L.F. Gunderson, Intelligence ≠ Autonomy ≠ Capability,
§ 4.1 (2004) (unpublished manuscript), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?
doi=10.1.1.78.8279&rep=rep1&type=pdf [https://perma.cc/29ZP-EB7D].  A truly autonomous 
robot could theoretically choose to “[sit] on a beach somewhere, drinking motor oil, [and] not
slav[e] away on some human assigned task.”  Id.
28. “Autonomous vehicles can be more or less thought of as robots that look like 
cars.” Jessica S. Brodsky, Note, Autonomous Vehicle Regulation: How an Uncertain Legal 
Landscape May Hit the Brakes on Self-Driving Cars, 31 BERKELEY TECH.L.J. 851, 862 (2016). 
29. CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750(a)(1) (West 2015) (defining “autonomous technology”). 
30. These decisions include “steering, braking, speed, distance between vehicles,
lane-choice, following traffic rules, routing, avoiding obstacles—and the role of the person 
is limited primarily to choosing the destination.”  Surden & Williams, supra note 23, at 133. 
31. JAMES M. ANDERSON ET AL., AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY: A GUIDE
FOR POLICYMAKERS 58 (2016), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/ 
RR400/RR443-2/RAND_RR443-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6KC-A8NR]. The vehicle’s sensors
gather data, which is interpreted by software algorithms to plan the vehicles movements, 
triggering an action. See id. at 58–59.
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sophisticated learning programs to recognize objects, such as a motorbike 
versus a bicycle, and track their movements; (4) path planning algorithms 
to get from point A to point B; (5) and decision engines that use prediction
algorithms to measure the likelihood of crashing.32 
The decision engines can be rule-based, where rules are hard-coded into 
the vehicle’s software, or they can be deep-learning neural networks, an
advanced form of AI that essentially programs itself.33  The neural networks
are built by using human drivers to train the vehicles, much like teaching 
a teenager how to drive.34  The human driver logs driving hours, while the 
AI watches through its vision system, such as LIDAR,35 allowing the AI 
to learn through experience, and then extrapolate those lessons into decisions
when it drives.36 This is valuable because an autonomous vehicle can
communicate and share its experiences with other autonomous vehicles, 
allowing them to learn and adapt their algorithms appropriately.37 
For over seventy years, society has been fascinated by the idea of a self-
driving car.38 After a gradual progression toward autonomy, this idea was
realized when Google put its first fully autonomous driverless car on the 
32. See Ben Lorica, The Technology Behind Self-Driving Vehicles, O’REILLY (Oct.
6, 2016), https://www.oreilly.com/ideas/the-technology-behind-self-driving-vehicles [https:// 
perma.cc/NG96-2DX5].
33. See Darrell Etherington, Drive.ai Uses Deep Learning To Teach Self-Driving 
Cars—And To Give Them a Voice, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 30, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/ 
2016/08/30/drive-ai-uses-deep-learning-to-teach-self-driving-cars-and-to-give-them-a-voice/ 
[https://perma.cc/JFY7-RLGV]; Carol Reiley, Deep Driving: A Revolutionary AI Technique is
About To Transform the Self-Driving Car, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www. 
technologyreview.com/s/602600/deep-driving/ [https://perma.cc/K5LA-P8LQ].
34. Etherington, supra note 33. 
35. “LIDAR essentially maps its surroundings by illuminating its targets with laser 
light and then analyz[es] that light to create a high resolution digital image.”  Amir Lliaifar,
LIDAR, Lasers, and Logic: Anatomy of an Autonomous Vehicle, DIGITAL TRENDS (Apr. 9,
2015, 3:51 PM), http://www.digitaltrends.com/cars/lidar-lasers-and-beefed-up-computers-the­
intricate-anatomy-of-an-autonomous-vehicle/ [https://perma.cc/JM9P-58EJ]. 
36. See Etherington, supra note 33. 
 37. Chris Giarratana, How AI Is Driving the Future of Autonomous Cars, 
READWRITE (Dec. 20, 2016), http://readwrite.com/2016/12/20/ai-driving-future-autonomous­
cars-tl4/ [https://perma.cc/E3T5-U99V] (“This type of shared experience and active learning 
creates a situation where autonomous cars, through Artificial Intelligence algorithms, can 
improve their ability to react to situations on the road without actually having to experience 
those situations first-hand.”). 
38. See Tom Vanderbilt, Autonomous Cars Through the Ages, WIRED (Feb. 6, 2012, 
6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2012/02/autonomous-vehicle-history/ [https://perma.cc/
L7KS-2XUN].
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road for testing in January 2015.39  The concept of an autonomous vehicle
first gained widespread public exposure in 1939 at General Motor’s Futurama
exhibit inside the New York World’s Fair.40  The exhibit promised to 
show visitors “the world of tomorrow” as it took them on a ride through
large models depicting a time in the distant future where interstate highways
exist and cars can drive themselves.41  These self-driving cars remained a
concept of the future until 2004, when fifteen vehicles set out to make
history by attempting to autonomously navigate a 142-mile course in the 
DARPA Grand Challenge.42  This U.S. military sponsored event was designed
to promote innovation and accelerate the development of autonomous
vehicles, in the hopes that they could be used as a substitute for humans in
dangerous military operations.43  Although no vehicle finished the course, 
the competition generated new ideas, triggering major advancements in
the development of autonomous vehicles.44  One year later, DARPA held 
its second Grand Challenge where five vehicles successfully completed 
the course.45  These rapid advancements compelled the private sector to take
 39. Alex Davies, Google’s Self-Driving Car Hits Roads Next Month—Without a
Wheel or Pedals, WIRED (Dec. 23, 2014, 1:24 PM), https://www.wired.com/2014/12/ 
google-self-driving-car-prototype-2/ [https://perma.cc/X7YB-ZSHJ].  The first “truly autonomous
car—meaning it could process images of the road ahead—was unveiled in 1977 by S. 
Tsugawa and his colleagues at Japan’s Tsukuba Mechanical Engineering Laboratory.” 
Vanderbilt, supra note 38.  “The car was equipped with two cameras that used analog computer
technology for signal processing [and] was capable of speeds up to 30 km/h (18.6 mph)
but was aided by an elevated rail.” Id.
 40. Vanderbilt, supra note 38. 
41. Chris Baker, April 30, 1939: The Future Arrives at New York World’s Fair, 
WIRED (Apr. 30, 2010, 12:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2010/04/0430new-york­
worlds-fair-opens/ [https://perma.cc/LB5C-L54L] (“The effect was like catching a glimpse of
the future from the window of an airplane. . . .  GM’s ride presented a utopia forged by
urban planning.  Sophisticated highways ran through rural farmland and eventually moved
into carefully ordered futuristic cities.  ‘You have to understand that the audience had
never even considered a future like this’ . . . .  ‘There wasn’t an interstate freeway system
in 1939. Not many people owned a car.’”). 
42. The DARPA Grand Challenge: Ten Years Later, DARPA (Mar. 13, 2014), 
http://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2014-03-13 [https://perma.cc/3MZS-JTVG]. 
43. Id.  “For more than fifty years, [the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA)] has held a singular and enduring mission: to make pivotal investments in breakthrough
technologies for national security.”  About DARPA, DARPA, http://www.darpa.mil/about­
us/about-darpa [https://perma.cc/D66J-EBJK]. 
44. The DARPA Grand Challenge, supra note 42.
 45. Id.  “To further raise the bar, DARPA conducted a third competition, the Urban 
Challenge, in 2007 that featured driverless vehicles navigating a complex course in a staged
city environment . . . negotiating other moving traffic and obstacles while obeying traffic
regulations. Six teams out of [eleven] successfully completed the course.” Id.
838
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notice, resulting in companies, such as Google, investing in autonomous 
technology for commercial use.46 
The world of tomorrow is now reality as Google’s test cars have 
autonomously driven more than five million miles through complex city 
streets, on highways, and have even braved the curves of San Francisco’s
famed Lombard Street.47  Google is not alone in this race for autonomy.
On April 9, 2016, Tesla confirmed that its cars had driven forty-seven
million miles using its Level 3 self-driving feature known as Autopilot.48 
On October 19, 2016, Tesla announced its new Enhanced Autopilot, which 
is a Level 4 in autonomy;49 it is currently working toward Full Self-Driving 
Capability, equivalent to a Level 5 in autonomy,50 with the goal of having
its driverless technology ready for commercial use by 2020.51  Additionally, 
46. Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 527
(2015).
47. On the Road, WAYMO, https://waymo.com/ontheroad/ [https://perma.cc/Q6FY­
J7FF] (noting that five million miles is the equivalent of 300 years of human driving experience); 
see also DMITRI DOLGOV, GOOGLE’S SELF DRIVING CAR PROJECT MONTHLY REPORT: TWO
MILLION MILES CLOSER TO A FULLY AUTONOMOUS FUTURE (2016), https://static.googleuser
content.com/media/www.google.com/en//selfdrivingcar/files/reports/report-0916.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7YZL-FZPH] (detailing Google’s first two million miles of autonomous 
driving).  On December 13, 2016, Google announced that its self-driving car project would
become its own entity called “Waymo.” Darrell Etherington & Lora Kolodny, Google’s 
Self-Driving Car Unit Becomes Waymo, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 13, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/
2016/12/13/googles-self-driving-car-unit-spins-out-as-waymo/ [https://perma.cc/LV6D-8TKS].
Waymo’s CEO emphasized that the company is a “self-driving technology company” and 
not a car company, stating that it is “not in the business of making better cars.”  Id.  Instead
it is “in the business of making better drivers.” Id.; see also Waymo, GOOGLE, https://www. 
google.com/selfdrivingcar/ [https://perma.cc/GEV9-B9M4] (“We are a self-driving technology
company with a mission to make it safe and easy for people and things to move around.”). 
48. Tesla (@TeslaMotors), TWITTER (Apr. 9, 2016, 9:56 AM), https://twitter.com/
teslamotors/status/718845153318834176 [https://perma.cc/Q9JB-JDWJ] (“Over 47M miles 
driven on Autopilot, the more you drive, the more we’ll learn.”).
49. The Tesla Team, All Tesla Cars Being Produced Now Have Full Self-Driving 
Hardware, TESLA (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.tesla.com/blog/all-tesla-cars-being-produced- 
now-have-full-self-driving-hardware [https://perma.cc/RHX3-CUM4]; see FEDERAL AUTOMATED
VEHICLES POLICY, infra note 54, at 9 (defining the levels of autonomy); see also Fred
Lambert, Tesla’s Software Timeline for ‘Enhanced Autopilot’ Transition Means ‘Full
Self-Driving Capability’ as Early as Next Year, ELECTREK (Oct. 20, 2016, 4:31 PM), https:// 
electrek.co/2016/10/20/tesla-enhanced-autopilot-full-self-driving-capability/ [https://perma.cc/
M36C-ZQB3].
50. Lambert, supra note 49; see FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES POLICY, infra note 
54, at 9 (defining the levels of autonomy). 
51.  Fred Lambert, Elon Musk Clarifies Tesla’s Plan for Level 5 Fully Autonomous
Driving: 2 Years Away from Sleeping in the Car, ELECTREK (Apr. 29, 2017, 2:05 PM),
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Uber and Volvo combined efforts to put human supervised prototypes on 
the streets of Pittsburgh in August 2016; Toyota invested one billion 
dollars in AI and robotics with the goal of meeting a 2020 deadline; and 
other companies such as BMW, Ford, and Nissan have set similar targets.52 
The difference between Google’s and Tesla’s vehicles is that Tesla is 
taking an incremental approach from semi-autonomous to autonomous, 
whereas Google’s prototype began as, and continues to be, fully autonomous
—there is no steering wheel, brake pedal, or accelerator; the sensors and
software do all the work.53 These varying degrees of autonomy led the
United States Department of Transport (DOT) to categorize vehicles into
six levels of driving automation based on “who does what, [and] when:”54 
Level 0—No Automation: the human driver does everything; 
Level 1—Driver Assistance: an automated system on the vehicle can sometimes
assist the human driver conduct some parts of the driving task;
Level 2—Partial Automation: an automated system on the vehicle can actually
conduct some parts of the driving task, while the human continues to monitor the
driving environment and performs the rest of the driving task; 
Level 3—Conditional Automation: an automated system can both actually
conduct some parts of the driving task and monitor the driving environment in
some instances, but the human driver must be ready to take back control when
the automated system requests;
Level 4—High Automation: an automated system can conduct the driving task
and monitor the driving environment, and the human need not take back control, 
but the automated system can operate only in certain environments and under
certain conditions; and
Level 5—Full Automation: the automated system can perform all driving tasks, 
under all conditions that a human driver could perform them.55 
https://electrek.co/2017/04/29/elon-musk-tesla-plan-level-5-full-autonomous-driving/ [https:// 
perma.cc/DK4N-MCPZ].
 52. Danielle Muoio, These 19 Companies Are Racing To Put Driverless Cars on the 
Road by 2020, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 18, 2016, 9:56 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ 
companies-making-driverless-cars-by-2020-2016-8/#tesla-is-aiming-to-have-its-driverless­
technology-ready-by-2018-1 [https://perma.cc/ERE3-HPYY]. 
53. Google Self-Driving Car Project, GOOGLE, https://web.archive.org/web/2016112
8083319/https://www.google.com/selfdrivingcar/how/ [https://perma.cc/35NR-7LBB].
54. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES
POLICY 1, 9 (2016), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/AV%20policy
%20guidance%20PDF.pdf [https://perma.cc/XYD8-URVA] [hereinafter FEDERAL AUTOMATED
VEHICLES POLICY].  In many ways, these levels “describe what a human is actually doing, 
what she is technically required to be doing, and what she is legally required . . . to be doing.”
Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Vehicle Are Probably Legal in the United States, 1 TEX.
A&M L. REV. 411, 423 (2015). 
55. FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES POLICY, supra note 54, at 9. The policy adopts 
the Society of Automotive Engineers’ (SAE) definitions for levels of automation ranging 
from “no automation” to “full automation.” Id.; see also Press Release, SAE International,
U.S. Department of Transportation’s New Policy on Automated Vehicles Adopts SAE
International’s Levels of Automation for Defining Driving Automation in On-Road Motor 
840
SELLWOOD (DO NOT DELETE) 8/14/2018 2:20 PM     
   









   
 
 
   
  
  
   
  
   
 




    
  
   
 
   
 
   
[VOL. 54:  829, 2017] The Road to Autonomy
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Categories 0–2 require a driver, categories 3–4 have little to no driver 
involvement depending on the environment and driving conditions, and 
category 5 is a fully autonomous vehicle, the performance of which is 
equal to that of a human driver, if not better.56  Ultimately, autonomous 
technology is replacing the conventional driver with an artificial driver. 
This shift in the role of the driver raises complex liability issues that
lawmakers need to address.  With every major automaker engaged in 
developing autonomous vehicles, lawmakers are urged to act early so they
have a hand in shaping the impact of this technology.57 
C. Tort Liability and the Evolution of Product Liability Laws 
Under the common law, a person who causes a car accident has committed 
a tort, and the primary concern of tort law is where to attribute blame.58 
Vehicles (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.prweb.com/releases/2016/09/prweb13707135.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7W5P-XFN9] (detailing the DOT’s adoption of SAE’s six levels of
automation).
56. FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES POLICY, supra note 54, at 9–10. 
57. In many ways, the current technology boom is reminiscent of the Industrial 
Revolution.  During the Industrial Revolution, machines began performing the work of
humans, and production became efficient and boosted the economy. See Robert Corday, 
The Evolution of Assembly Lines: A Brief History, ROBOHUB (Apr. 24, 2014), http://robohub. 
org/the-evolution-of-assembly-lines-a-brief-history/ [https://perma.cc/7WXQ-PA8G].
Nevertheless, fear was associated with technology because as factories opened, they
replaced smaller businesses, and as production moved from handmade to machine-made, 
it displaced workers. See id.  The technological revolution of today is no different—
automation could result in the displacement of workers as it becomes a substitute for labor. 
See Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution: What It Means, How To Respond, 
WORLD ECON. F. (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth­
industrial-revolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond/ [https://perma.cc/JN9C-KZTD].
Uber alone has “600,000 drivers in the United States and 1.5 million [drivers] around the 
world.” Matt McFarland, Is Uber’s Push for Self-Driving Cars a Job Killer?, CNN
MONEY (Aug. 19, 2016, 7:15 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/08/19/technology/uber­
self-driving-cars-jobs/ [https://perma.cc/EN2K-5GVS].  The same thing could happen to 
lawyers, doctors, accountants, and teachers because driverless cars are but one example of 
how AI and robotics can be utilized.  See Richard Susskind & Daniel Susskind, Technology 
Will Replace Many Doctors, Lawyers, and Other Professionals, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct.
11, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/10/robots-will-replace-doctors-lawyers-and-other-professionals
[https://perma.cc/6GM9-UXAU].  As such, lawmakers need to recognize the current and 
future effects of technology. 
58. See MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 1 (9th ed. 2011)
(Tort law is concerned with “whether one whose actions harm another should be required
to pay compensation for the harm done.”); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
 841





   
 














     
   
 
 
     




     
  
     
      
       
 
In a conventional driver-operated car accident, blame is usually attributed 
to the driver or the manufacturer.59  For example, when dealing with a 
defective product, like defective brakes, the principles of products liability
apply, whereby liability is imposed on the manufacturer or distributor for 
the injuries caused by that product.60  Similarly, when the injury is caused 
by carelessness, such as a driver running a red light, negligence becomes 
the basis for liability, and tort law looks to what the reasonably prudent
person would do in the same or similar circumstances.61  The assumption 
with liability is that a human actor has done something wrong and a human
actor will be responsible.62  Nevertheless, when a fully autonomous robot
actor is involved, such as when an autonomous vehicle crashes into another 
autonomous vehicle, the ordinary rules of liability become insufficient because 
there is no human acting.63  This shift in responsibility creates a gap in the
tort framework where liability would usually be attributed to the driver. 
Similarly, prior to the advent of products liability law, there was a gap 
in the tort framework where liability should have been attributed to the 
manufacturer.  Before the automobile, “there simply were not large numbers
of product-related lawsuits.”64  As such, products liability law developed 
through a series of groundbreaking automobile liability cases that separated 
tort law from the old horse and buggy laws grounded in contract law.65  These
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 4 (5th ed. 1984) (“If the driver proceeds without reasonable 
care and injures another, it is a tort.”).
59. See generally  FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 58, at 30–39, 507–71 (explaining
that blame can be imputed through driver negligence or a product defect).
60. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1998)
(“One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells
or distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property
caused by the defect.”).
61. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2010); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 58, § 32, at 175 (“[N]egligence
is a failure to do what the reasonable person would do ‘under the same or similar
circumstances.’”).
62. WEAVER, supra note 8, at 17.
63. In the United States, current laws treat products and machines as “legal extensions
of the people who set them into motion.” A. Michael Froomkin, Introduction to ROBOT 
LAW, at xiv (Ryan Calo et al. eds., 2016).  When shifting responsibility from the human 
driver to the vehicle, it is “likely to undermine the conventional social attribution of blame 
for automobile crashes. . . .  In crashes that involve drivers reasonably relying on a car’s
ability to control itself, there may not be [a traditional] at-fault driver for the victim to 
sue.”  ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 115–16 (footnote omitted). 
64. 1 LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1.02 (rev. 
ed. 2015). 
65. “Products liability . . . grew up with the automobile.” Id.  “In particular, the 
MacPherson doctrine, which banished the no-privity-of-contract defense from negligence 
actions against manufacturers, took decades to spread across the nation . . . .” OWEN, supra
note 7, at 249 (footnotes omitted). 
842
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cases accomplished this by slowly eroding the privity doctrine, which mandated
that only a party to a contract could sue for its breach.66  Accordingly, when
a manufacturer sells a faulty vehicle to a dealer, who in turn sells it to the 
plaintiff, only the dealer is in privity of contract with the plaintiff; thus, only 
the dealer can be sued.  Consequently, this doctrine shielded manufacturers 
from liability.67 This shield often left the plaintiff without a remedy because
it was the manufacturer’s negligence, not the dealer’s negligence, that caused 
the harm.68 
In 1916, Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo began the erosion of the privity 
doctrine through MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., where he held the
manufacturer liable for a defective wheel.69 It then took decades for products
liability to spread through the nation; and only in 1963, through Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., was the concept of a manufacturer being
held strictly liable for a defective product expounded.70 
As transportation has advanced from the horse and buggy to automobiles, 
and liability has shifted from privity of contract to the manufacturer, courts
have been forced to recognize and fill gaps in the liability framework.  The 
introduction of autonomous vehicles creates yet another gap in this framework 
due to the absence of a human driver.  As society ventures into the autonomous 
era, lawmakers need be proactive in creating a sufficient framework for 
autonomous vehicles, so that law is not once again outpaced by technology.
 66. See FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 58, at 551 (“Nineteenth century products
liability law languished in the shadow of the privity doctrine, which required a contractual 
relationship between the parties as the basis for [liability].”).
67. See, e.g., Winterbottom v. Wright (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (explaining 
that the plaintiff, Winterbottom, attempted to sue the manufacturer for his injuries caused 
by the collapse of his mail coach due to a faulty wheel; however, the court held that the 
manufacturer was not liable, reasoning that there was no privity of contract between
Winterbottom and the manufacturer). 
68. See id. at 405–06 (“[I]t is, no doubt, a hardship upon the plaintiff to be without 
a remedy, but by that consideration we ought not to be influenced. . . .  Judgment for the 
defendant.”). 
69. 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) (holding that “[i]f [the manufacturer] is 
negligent, where danger is to be foreseen, a liability will follow”).
70. 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) (reasoning that “[manufacturer] liability is
not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort”); 
see also Donald M. Jenkins, The Product Liability of Manufacturers: An Understanding
and Exploration, 4 AKRON L. REV. 135, 154 (1971) (“[Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 
Inc.] is recognized as the first to expound the theory of a manufacturer’s strict liability in
tort . . . influenc[ing] the ultimate provisions of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts.”).
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III. CURRENT REGULATION AND THE NEED FOR ACTION
In 2011, Nevada became the first state to authorize the operation of 
autonomous vehicles.71  Since 2011, twenty-one other states and Washington, 
D.C., have also passed legislation regarding the testing and operation of 
autonomous vehicles.72  There is, however, no uniform approach.  California,
for example, enacted Senate Bill No. 1298, requiring the autonomous vehicle 
operator to possess a valid driver’s license and obtain an additional “Test
Vehicle Operator Permit.”73  In contrast, Nevada requires the operator to
have a “G Endorsement” on their driver’s license limiting testing to
daylight hours,74 whereas Florida only requires a valid driver’s license.75 
These conflicting laws pose a problem because they obstruct the free flow 
of autonomous vehicles across state lines.  Additionally, these laws only 
regulate the operation and insurance of autonomous vehicles during the 
testing phase; they do not govern the behavior of the vehicles, or their
liability, outside of testing.76 
On September 20, 2016, the United States Department of Transport 
implemented the first federal policy on automated vehicles in response to 
71. See 2011 Nev. Stat. 2876 (codified at NEV.REV.STAT.§ 482A.100.) (“[A]uthorizing
the operation of autonomous vehicles on highways within the State of Nevada.”).  In 
addition, Assembly Bill 511 defines an autonomous vehicle as “a motor vehicle that uses 
artificial intelligence, sensors and global positioning system coordinates to drive itself without 
the active intervention of a human operator.” Id.
 72. Autonomous Vehicles | Self-Driving Vehicles Enacted Legislation, NAT’L CONF.
ST. LEGISLATURES (Mar. 26, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomous­
vehicles-legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/UT8V-8Y2J].  These states include: Alabama, 
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Michigan, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia and Vermont. Id.
73. 2012 Cal. Stat. 5012 (codified at CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750 (West 2016)); CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 227.20 (2017) (requiring a Test Vehicle Operator Permit which
commands a clean driving record with no at-fault accidents resulting in injury or death,
and no convictions in the past ten years for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs). 
74. NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.040 (2012) (“[A] person who holds a driver’s license in
[Nevada] and wishes to operate an autonomous vehicle in autonomous mode in [Nevada]
must obtain a G endorsement on his or her driver’s license . . . .”); NEV. DEP’T OF MOTOR
VEHICLES, RESTRICTION CODES AND DESCRIPTIONS (2016), http://www.dmvnv.com/pdfforms/
restriction_codes.pdf [https://perma.cc/HR2A-YJDC] (restricting driving privileges to
“[d]aylight driving only”).
75. Amy Sherman, In Florida, No Permit Needed for Driverless Cars, Florida Senator
Says, POLITIFACT (Dec. 28, 2016, 3:00 PM), http://www.politifact.com/florida/statements/
2016/dec/28/jeff-brandes/florida-no-permit-needed-driverless-cars-florida-s/ [https://perma.cc/
J352-2SJU].
76. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 38755 (West 2017) (authorizing the Contra Costa
Transportation Authority to conduct a pilot project for the testing of fully autonomous 
vehicles provided the testing is conducted at specified locations, the autonomous vehicle 
does not exceed speeds of thirty-five miles per hour, and the company provides proof of a 
$5 million insurance policy, among other requirements).
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the growing industry.77 Safety is a huge concern with regards to the
development of this technology; therefore, the objective of the Federal 
Automated Vehicles Policy is to encourage strong safety oversight, but not 
overregulation.78  Through loose guidelines, the policy outlines a fifteen-
point Safety Assessment for the “safe design, development, testing, and
deployment” of autonomous vehicles, and encourages states to implement
consistent policies regarding these vehicles.79  However, these regulations
focus on safety and insurance; they do not clarify liability.  Definitive guidelines
are essential to ensure the safe integration of autonomous technology into
the commercial market and onto the roadways.
Recognition of these technological advancements require lawmakers to 
be proactive in passing laws, as opposed to the advent of the automobile 
where laws were responsive.80  AI is shifting from “building systems that 
are intelligent to building intelligent systems that are human-aware and
 77. See FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES POLICY, supra note 54, at 3.
 78. See id.; see also Cecilia Kang, Self-Driving Cars Gain Powerful Ally: The
Government, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/20/technology/
self-driving-cars-guidelines.html (“The [policy guidelines] signaled to motorists that automated
vehicles would not be a Wild West where companies can try anything without oversight, 
but [it was] also vague enough that automakers and technology companies would not fear 
overregulation.”). 
79. FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES POLICY, supra note 54, at 6, 39; see also Press 
Release, The White House, Encouraging the Safe and Responsible Deployment of Automated 
Vehicles (Sept. 19, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/19/fact­
sheet-encouraging-safe-and-responsible-deployment-automated [https://perma.cc/G78M­
7ATJ] (announcing the Federal Automated Vehicles Policy as a means to “facilitate the 
responsible introduction of automated vehicles” to the roadways); Cecilia Kang, The 15-
Point Federal Checklist for Self-Driving Cars, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2016), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2016/09/21/technology/the-15-point-federal-checklist-for-self-driving­
cars.html (outlining the fifteen-point Safety Assessment).
80. The Future of Life Institute is taking a proactive approach to the integration of
AI and autonomy into society by encouraging research.  In an open letter signed by influential
leaders in technology, including Elon Musk, Steve Wozniak, Nick Bostrom, and the late
Stephen Hawking, the Future of Life Institute noted that “the growing capabilities of AI 
are leading to an increased potential for impact on human society.”  Stuart Russell et al.,
Research Priorities for Robust and Beneficial Artificial Intelligence, AI MAG., Winter 
2015, at 105, 112.  As part of the letter they attached a “Research Priorities Document,” 
emphasizing the impact of intelligence and autonomy on law and ethics.  Id. at 107.  It 
lists issues such as liability, weaponry, and privacy as part of their short-term research
priorities, with the goal of implementing appropriate policies so society “can enjoy the
benefits [of AI] while risks are minimized.” Id.  As part of its long-term research priorities,
the Future of Life Institute recognizes the ultimate goal of developing Artificial General 
Intelligence and affords a “duty to AI researchers to ensure that the future impact is
beneficial.” Id. at 109, 112. 
 845







      








    
 







    
    
 
      
     
 
 
     
    
        
   
 
 
trustworthy.”81  Since commercial autonomy is so new, autonomous vehicles
“will strongly influence the public’s perception of AI,” and part of that
perception is that they are safe.82  In the United States, over 35,000 people
are killed and over two million people are injured every year due to car
crashes.83 The NHTSA estimates that motor vehicle crashes cost $242 
billion annually, including the cost of medical bills, lost wages, legal fees, 
auto repairs, and delays.84  Moreover, 94% of those crashes are caused by a
human choice or error.85  Human choice factors, such as speeding, drunken
driving, fatigue, and distracted driving, alone account for over 23,000 fatal 
crashes annually.86  The introduction of autonomous vehicles poses a solution 
because they will completely eliminate crashes caused by human choice,
as the vehicles will never be intoxicated, fatigued, or distracted.87 
In 2013, the Eno Center for Transportation released a study on the potential 
impacts of autonomous vehicles.88  They projected that if 10% of the vehicles
on United States roads were autonomous, 1,100 lives would be saved
annually, and there would be 211,000 fewer crashes; if 50% of the vehicles 
were autonomous, 9,600 lives would be saved annually, and there would 
be 1,880,000 fewer crashes; and if 90% of the vehicles were autonomous, 
21,700 lives would be saved annually, and there would be 4,220,000 fewer
 81. 2015 STUDY PANEL, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LIFE IN 2030: ONE HUNDRED
YEARS STUDY ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 1, 14 (2016), https://ai100.stanford.edu/sites/ 
default/files/ai_100_report_0831fnl.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZG5-R3PZ]. 
82. Id. at 7. 
83. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS ANNUAL REPORT 135 (2016), 
https://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/TSAR_2016_rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/
QF7J-WWAG] [hereinafter TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS ANNUAL REPORT] (reporting 
35,092 motor vehicle fatalities and 2.44 million non-fatal motor vehicle injuries in 2015). 
84. Id. at 152. 
85. Press Release, Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., U.S. DOT Issues Federal 
Policy for Safe Testing and Deployment of Automated Vehicles (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www. 
nhtsa.gov/press-releases/us-dot-issues-federal-policy-safe-testing-and-deployment-automated- 
vehicles [https://perma.cc/78VA-GZZW] [hereinafter U.S. DOT Issues Federal Policy].
86. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATISTICS & ANALYSIS,
TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: 2015 MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES 1, 6 (2016), https://crashstats. 
nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812318 [https://perma.cc/J4G4-MV7M] (reporting
3,477 fatalities due to distracted driving, 10,265 fatalities involving an alcohol-impaired 
driver, and 9,557 fatalities due to speeding-related crashes).
87. See U.S. DOT Issues Federal Policy, supra note 85 (“[W]e see a future where
self-driving cars will save thousands of lives on our roads. A self-driving car can’t get drunk.  
A self-driving car can’t get distracted.  And a self-driving car will follow the traffic laws 
and prioritize safety for pedestrians and bicyclists.”). 
88. See DANIEL J. FAGNANT & KARA M. KOCKELMAN, PREPARING A NATION FOR
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crashes.89  These statistics are, in large part, the result of an autonomous 
vehicle’s ability to benefit from the data and experience of other autonomous
vehicles on the road; thereby avoiding the errors that human drivers repeatedly 
make.90 
Nevertheless, several safety regulations center around the driver.  The 
current federal definition of a driver is “the occupant of a motor vehicle 
seated immediately behind the steering control system.”91  However, a fully 
autonomous vehicle does not need a steering control system.  Legal scholar
Bryant Walker Smith examined this inconsistency and concluded that 
under the 1949 Geneva Convention on Road Traffic, to which the United
States is a party, the term driver is probably flexible enough to include 
nonhuman drivers.92 This issue was also addressed by the NHTSA when 
Google requested clarification concerning the term driver.93  By design,
Google’s self-driving cars have no conventional driver controls such as a 
steering wheel and brake pedals; the vehicles are instead operated and controlled
through a self-driving AI system, making the driver redundant.94  As such,
Google’s request did not entail a simple expansion of the term driver, but 
instead an alteration to the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards.95 
While the NHTSA did not make any changes to the Federal Motor Vehicle 
Safety Standards, it did interpret the law to consider the self-driving AI 
system, piloting Google’s self-driving cars, as the driver.96  Although this
recognition is not legally binding, it does indicate that, for legal purposes,
 89. Id. at 8 tbl.2 (summarizing the estimated economic and safety benefits of autonomous 
vehicles).
90. See id. at 3 (“Driver error is believed to be the main reason behind over [ninety]
percent of all crashes.”).
91.  49 C.F.R. § 571.3 (2005). 
92. Smith, supra note 54, at 433–34.  The Geneva Convention is a “multi-country
agreement that promotes road safety by establishing certain common rules for automobile
and other vehicles.”  Brodsky, supra note 28, at 858. 
93.  Letter from Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, supra note 9. 
94. Id. (“Because Google’s [self-driving vehicle] design purposely does not have
any mechanism by which human occupants could steer or otherwise ‘drive’ the vehicle, it 
would be difficult in several instances to determine who the ‘driver’ would be . . . .”).
95. Id. (“NHTSA will consider initiating rulemaking to address whether the definition
of ‘driver’ in Section 571.3 should be updated in response to changing circumstances . . . .”). 
96. Id. (concluding that the “NHTSA will interpret ‘driver’ in the context of
Google’s described motor vehicle design as referring to the [Self-Driving System], and
not to any of the vehicle occupants”).  The letter went on to state that “[i]f no human
occupant of the vehicle can actually drive the vehicle, it is more reasonable to identify the
‘driver’ as whatever (as opposed to whoever) is doing the driving. In this instance . . . the 
[fully autonomous Self-Driving System] is actually driving the vehicle.” Id.
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the NHTSA is willing to consider the AI system as a legal entity—an
artificial person.97 
Although this groundbreaking step advances the legal standing of AI
and autonomy, at present there is still no framework in place for autonomous
vehicle liability.  Even though autonomous vehicles are intended to considerably
reduce crashes, accidents are inevitable.  Policies need to be implemented
that will maximize the social benefit of this technology, while minimizing
its risk.98 
IV. THE IMPACT OF SHIFTING LIABILITY
In a conventional car accident, liability is typically attributed to the
driver or the vehicle manufacturer.99  However, removing the driver from
the equation produces a gap in the liability framework. Legal scholars have 
debated whether existing tort laws will be sufficient to address autonomous 
vehicle liability, with the majority concluding that the tort framework will
remain adequate.100  But proponents of conforming regular tort principals 
to autonomous vehicles fail to account for the introduction of AI into the
driving model.101  More specifically, they are not factoring in the driving 
decisions made by AI.102  As such, they are skipping over the AI as a responsible 
party, and are instead advocating for liability to be shifted from the driver 
97. See Dave Gershgorn, Google’s Driverless Cars Will Be Legally Treated Like 
Human Drivers, POPULAR SCI. (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.popsci.com/googles-cars-will­
be-treated-like-human-drivers [https://perma.cc/XD5P-BLW7]. 
98. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at xiii. 
99. See generally FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 58 (explaining that blame can be 
imputed through driver negligence or a product defect).
100. See, e.g., Kyle Graham, Of Frightened Horses and Autonomous Vehicles: Tort 
Law and Its Assimilation of Inventions, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1241, 1269–70 (2012)
(“Early claims likely will resemble contemporary lawsuits that allege negligent vehicle 
use. . . . On the whole, I am more optimistic . . . about the interplay between tort law and
autonomous vehicles.”); Jeremy Levy, No Need To Reinvent the Wheel: Why Existing
Liability Law Does Not Need To Be Preemptively Altered To Cope with the Debut of the 
Driverless Car, 9 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 355, 387 (2015) (“[S]trict products liability
is already in place to hold the manufacturers accountable.  Meanwhile, the consumer will 
assume liability as a typical car owner or driver already does, and then defer this liability
to individual private insurers.”); Andrew P. Garza, Comment, “Look Ma, No Hands!”:
Wrinkles and Wrecks in the Age of Autonomous Vehicles, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 581, 581, 
595 (“Products liability law is capable of handling the new technology just as it handled
the incorporation of seat belts, air bags, and cruise control.”).
101. See Brodsky, supra note 28, at 861 (“[T]he hypotheticals and examples [scholars]
use to illustrate how existing tort and contract law can address potential problems with 
autonomous vehicles . . . do not account for many of the added complexities that arise 
when artificial intelligence is introduced.”).
102. See id.
848
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to the owner or manufacturer, thereby circumventing this liability gap
as opposed to filling it.103 
As autonomous vehicles become more prevalent on the roads, more accidents
involving autonomous vehicles will inevitably occur.104  As such, it
is important that autonomous vehicle owners know how the legal system 
will respond.105  Once autonomous vehicles become commercially available,
there will be no human actively in control of the vehicle.  Thus, laws must
be in place to determine where liability lies.  The potentially liable parties 
could be anyone from the owner of the vehicle, to “the vehicle manufacturer, 
the manufacturer of a component used in the autonomous system, [or] the 
software engineer who programmed the code for the autonomous operation 
of the vehicle.”106 
The following analysis is conducted under the assumption that the vehicle 
is a Level 5, fully autonomous vehicle, with no defects.  Liability for 
vehicles categorized as levels 0–4 will likely be governed by pre-existing 
tort law because the driver remains in control of the vehicle in some capacity,107 
whereas the AI system piloting a fully autonomous vehicle is the sole driver.
This section explores the liability shift to the owner and manufacturer, and 
concludes that liability should not be attributed to either party.
 103. See ROYAL ACAD. OF ENG’G, AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS: SOCIAL, LEGAL AND
ETHICAL ISSUES 1, 8 (2009), https://www.raeng.org.uk/publications/reports/autonomous­
systems-report [https://perma.cc/8KQM-K6Z7] (“When a driver cedes control of their car
to its own navigating or driving systems . . . they also give away some responsibility.”). 
104. See, e.g., Neal E. Boudette, Autopilot Cited in Death of Chinese Tesla Driver, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/15/business/fatal-tesla­
crash-in-china-involved-autopilot-government-tv-says.html; Danny Yadron & Dan Tynan,
Tesla Driver Dies in First Fatal Crash While Using Autopilot Mode, GUARDIAN (June 30,
2016, 7:14 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jun/30/tesla-autopilot­
death-self-driving-car-elon-musk [https://perma.cc/D5TP-PVE4]; Chris Ziegler, A Google 
Self-Driving Car Caused a Crash for the First Time, VERGE (Feb. 29, 2016, 1:50 PM), 
http://www.theverge.com/2016/2/29/11134344/google-self-driving-car-crash-report [https:// 
perma.cc/76WC-K3AA].
105. Like the advent of the automobile, social policy favors certainty as opposed to
the imposition of ill-fitted “horse and buggy” laws on modern driverless car cases. See Nixon, 
supra note 4, at 476. 
106. Gary E. Marchant & Rachel A. Lindor, The Coming Collision Between Autonomous 
Vehicles and the Liability System, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1321, 1328 (2012). 
107. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 3. 
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A. Shifting Liability to the Owner 
There are two main theories of liability that govern tort law— 
negligence, which is fault-based liability, and strict liability, which is non-
fault liability.108  Negligence is the failure to do what a reasonably prudent
person would do under the same or similar circumstances, thereby attributing 
blame to the faulty party.109 In order for a driver to be found negligent the
plaintiff must prove: (1) the driver had a duty of due care; (2) that duty of 
due care was breached; (3) there is a causal connection between the breach
and (4) the injury.110  Therefore, negligence mandates that the driver act, 
or fail to act, to be held liable for any harm caused by the vehicle.111 
Conversely, in strict liability cases, fault is not at issue—a party can be held 
legally responsible for the damage regardless of culpability.112 
1. From Negligence to a Strict Liability Regime 
Traditionally, drivers are held liable for the negligent use or operation 
of a vehicle; for example, failing to brake and rear-ending a vehicle.  This is
because the driver is in control of the vehicle, and with due care can avoid
the risk.113 As such, the central goal of negligence is to deter undesirable
behavior by holding the driver accountable for their bad driving.114  However,
shifting liability to the owner will result in the owner being strictly liable
 108. OWEN, supra note 7, at 315 (“It is elemental that the very basis of negligence 
liability . . . is grounded in fault.  In contrast, the very basis of strict products liability in
tort is the supplier’s responsibility for harm caused by product defects regardless of fault.” 
(footnote omitted)).
109. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2010); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. b (AM.
LAW INST. 1965) (“The words ‘reasonable man’ denote a person exercising those qualities
of attention, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment which society requires of its members 
for the protection of their own interests and the interests of others.”); KEETON ET AL., supra
note 58, § 32, at 175 (defining the reasonable person as “a prudent and careful person, who
is always up to standard”). 
110. KEETON ET AL., supra note 58, § 30, at 164–65. 
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 284 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
112. See Economic Analysis of Alternative Standards of Liability in Accident Law, 
BRIDGE, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/bridge/LawEconomics/neg-liab.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
HRK6-TDFC] (“Under a strict liability rule, the defendant pays for the injury his conduct 
causes the plaintiff regardless of whether the defendant was negligent.”). 
113. See Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1176–77 
(1990) (reasoning that strict liability is only appropriate against parties engaged in abnormally
dangerous activities, whereas negligence liability is proper if the risk can be avoided with
the exercise of due care).
114. See DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS 15 (2d ed. 2016). 
850
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for every choice the autonomous vehicle makes, regardless of fault, thereby 
“attenuat[ing] the relationship between legal responsibility and legal fault.”115 
If driver-negligence were imputed to the owner, the average consumer 
would likely be discouraged from buying an autonomous vehicle because 
consumer acceptance depends largely on cost, and assuming additional
liability results in a greater financial burden, especially when that liability
is non-fault liability.116  Autonomous vehicles are built with the primary 
purpose of promoting safety and decreasing the number of car accidents.117 
As seen in the study conducted by the Eno Center for Transportation, the 
higher the percentage of autonomous vehicles on the road, the fewer accidents 
and the more lives saved annually.118  In fact, autonomous vehicles are 
expected to reduce traffic fatalities by 90%, or roughly 31,000 lives a year.119 
For this reason, social policy should encourage the purchase of autonomous
vehicles.  However, markets work based on supply and demand; if attributing 
additional blame hampers the acceptance and sale of autonomous vehicles, 
the low sales will in turn hamper innovation and the mass production of 
these vehicles, returning society to the high accident rates caused by human 
115. Smith, supra note 54, at 477. 
116. A prime example of a product that failed to commercialize is the Segway.  See
Gary Rivlin, Segway’s Breakdown, WIRED (Mar. 1, 2003, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired. 
com/2003/03/segway/ [https://perma.cc/245S-LNVF].  Invented by Dean Kamen, the Segway
began as a top-secret project code-named “Ginger” and “IT,” set to revolutionize transportation.
Id. Kamen boldly predicted that the Segway would “be to the car what the car was to
the horse and buggy.” Id.  However, industrial models were initially priced around $8,000, 
and commercial models retailed at $3,000 to $4,950. John Heilemann, Reinventing the
Wheel, TIME (Dec. 2, 2001), http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,186660, 
00.html; Rivlin, supra. Kamen expected to sell “10,000 units a week by the end of 2002,” 
but over the next six years, “Segway sold just 30,000 units.” Jordan Golson, Well, That 
Didn’t Work: The Segway Is a Technological Marvel. Too Bad It Doesn’t Make Any Sense, 
WIRED (Jan. 16, 2015, 10:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/01/well-didnt-work­
segway-technological-marvel-bad-doesnt-make-sense/ [https://perma.cc/CL6U-8RGH].
Ultimately, the Segway failed to impact mass markets because its hefty price tag was unappealing 
to the public, who opted to walk rather than pay $5,000 for what was essentially a scooter. 
See Rivlin, supra. 
117. See FAGNANT & KOCKELMAN, supra note 88, at 7–9.
118. See id.
 119. Adrienne Lafrance, Self-Driving Cars Could Save 300,000 Lives per Decade in 
America, ATLANTIC (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/ 
2015/09/self-driving-cars-could-save-300000-lives-per-decade-in-america/407956/ [https://
perma.cc/Z454-58TW] (“Researchers estimate that driverless cars could, by midcentury, 
reduce traffic fatalities by up to [ninety] percent.”). The 31,000 is calculated using statistics from
the U.S. Department of Transportation, reporting 35,092 motor vehicle fatalities in 2015. 
TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 83, at 135. 
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choice or error.120  Additionally, it may deter insurance companies from
including autonomous vehicles in their policies because of the potential 
for costly damage.121 
Furthermore, strict liability is often connected with the notion of control: 
“the control exercised by a vehicle owner over [their] vehicle, the control
exercised by a pet owner over [their] pet, the control exercised by an employer
over its employees . . . .”122  In a fully autonomous vehicle, the owner is a
passive passenger with no operational control and, therefore, no ability to
act or prevent an accident.123  Consequently, the common goals associated
with tort law will not be served by shifting liability because the owner has 
no control; holding the owner liable will not deter bad driving, nor will it 
impose greater vigilance.  For these reasons, driver-liability should not be
imposed on the owner. 
2. Current Owner-Liability 
Similarly, the goals of current owner-liability laws will not be served if
extended to autonomous vehicles.  There are four ways an owner can
currently be held liable for an accident even if they are not driving: (1) 
modification of the vehicle by the owner, (2) negligent entrustment, (3) state 
permissive use statutes, and (4) respondeat superior.124  In certain instances,
the owner of an autonomous vehicles should remain liable.  For example, 
if the owner attempts to override the AI system piloting the vehicle, or 
modifies the vehicle in any way, then the normal principals of negligence 
will apply because the owner did not act as a reasonably prudent person
would.125  However, the remaining liability theories become problematic. 
120. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 118. 
121. KPMG, MARKETPLACE OF CHANGE: AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE IN THE ERA OF
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 1, 27 (2015) [hereinafter MARKETPLACE OF CHANGE], https://home. 
kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/05/marketplace-change.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QR8-
DM3H].  The cost of an autonomous vehicle accident could be enormous.  See id. at 27. 
KPMG’s study finds the “drastic reduction in incidents per vehicle will be somewhat offset 
by the increased severity incurred in each accident” due to the expensive technology needed for
autonomous operation. Id.  In fact, KPMG estimates that the cost per accident could “increase
from almost $14,000 to roughly $35,000 by 2040.” Id.
 122. Smith, supra note 54, at 477 (footnotes omitted). 
123. See FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES POLICY, supra note 54, at 9 (“At . . . Level 
5, the automated system can perform all driving tasks, under all conditions that a human driver 
could perform them.”); see also supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text (“Autonomy
on the other hand, has to do with control. An autonomous robot is self-governing and can 
act independently of external commands.”). 
124. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 58, § 69, at 499–501, § 73, at 522–24, 527–28. 
125. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2010); id. § 32, at 175. 
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In most cases, liability is imposed under the theory of negligent entrustment, 
or vicariously through state permissive use statutes.126  The difference 
between the two theories is the negligent party.127  Negligent entrustment
holds the vehicle owner negligent for entrusting his vehicle to a person who
the owner knew, or had reason to believe, was incompetent or unfit to
drive.128  State permissive use statutes attribute liability vicariously to the 
owner for permitting the driver to use the owner’s vehicle, even though it 
is the driver’s negligence, and not the owner’s negligence that caused the
accident.129  The policy behind these statutes is to ensure injured parties are
compensated because a vehicle owner has liability insurance, but the driver 
may not.130  Alternatively, the doctrine of respondeat superior utilizes agency
law to impose vicarious non-fault liability on an employer for the negligence
of his employee, provided the employee’s actions are within the scope of
employment.131  Essentially, an autonomous vehicle is like a chauffeur; thus, 
one could attribute liability to the owner by re-categorizing the autonomous
vehicle as an employee.132 
However, even these traditional owner liability theories do not fully
support autonomous vehicles.  For example, if an owner entrusts his vehicle
to a drunk or unlicensed driver who causes an accident, then the owner
has breached his duty of due care to other drivers on the road by allowing
an unfit driver to use his vehicle—failing to act.133  Therefore, the owner 
126. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 58, § 73, at 522–24, 527–28. 
127.  Negligent entrustment holds the negligent person liable, whereas vicarious liability
imposes liability on one person for the negligence of another person.  See id. § 69, at 499, 
§ 73, at 522–24, 527–28. 
128. Id. § 73, at 523 (“Where the owner of the car entrusts it to an unsuitable driver, 
he is held liable for the negligence of the driver, upon the basis of his own negligence in not
preventing it.”).
129. Id. § 73, at 527 (“Such statutes make the owner of the automobile liable for injuries
to third persons caused by the negligence of any person . . . who is operating the car on the 
public highway with the owner’s consent.” (footnotes omitted)). 
130. Comment, The Owner Consent Statutes: The Distinctions Between Enterprise 
and Instrumentality Liability, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 355, 355 (1964); see Alternatives to Car 
Insurance, DMV.ORG, http://www.dmv.org/insurance/alternatives-to-auto-insurance.php
[https://perma.cc/L697-CVX9] (“As of 2014, nearly all of the 50 states require you to
demonstrate ‘financial responsibility’ for a car accident, and car insurance is generally the 
simplest way to fulfill this responsibility.”).  Other options include: a surety bond, funds
deposited with the state, or a certificate of self-insurance. Id.
 131. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
132. See SAMIR CHOPRA & LAURENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY FOR AUTONOMOUS 
ARTIFICIAL AGENTS 129–30 (2011). 
133. See KEATON ET AL., supra note 58, § 73, at 523. 
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is said to be negligent and can be found liable for the driver’s acts.134 
However, autonomous vehicles are meant to eliminate human-choice factors,
such as speeding, drunken driving, fatigue, and distracted driving, and in
doing so are projected to save thousands of lives annually.135 Thus, classifying 
an autonomous vehicle as incompetent or unfit contradicts the purpose of 
the vehicle. In fact, one could say that the benefits of an autonomous vehicle
are so great that they result in the inversion of negligent entrustment, where 
failing to act is not sanctioning the use of the vehicle, but rather preventing 
the vehicle from being used and thereby endangering thousands of lives.
Additionally, state permissive use statutes are in place to cover an uninsured 
driver; however, with an autonomous vehicle, the driver and the vehicle
are one.136  Thus, insurance for one means insurance for the other.  Furthermore,
these statutes impose liability based on the owner giving permission to the 
driver to use the vehicle.137  However, fully autonomous vehicles are self-
driving vehicles that do not require the “active physical control or monitoring” 
of a human operator.138  Therefore, there is no way to operate an autonomous
vehicle other than to permit it to drive. Consequently, the owner is liable 
every time the vehicle is in use, thereby circling back to a strict liability
regime.
Similarly, respondeat superior mandates that an employee’s actions
must be within the scope of employment for liability to be imposed on an 
employer.139  However, an autonomous vehicle’s job is to drive, so every 
time it is active, its actions are within the scope of its employment.  Like 
state permissive use statutes, the owner will be liable every time the vehicle 
is in use.  Additionally, one of the policies behind respondeat superior is 
that the employer has deep pockets, and therefore more resources to pay
damages than the employee.140  However, if an autonomous vehicle is
purchased as a family car, it does not generate any income for the owner.141
 134. See id.
135. U.S. DOT Issues Federal Policy, supra note 85; see also FAGNANT & KOCKELMAN, 
supra note 88, at 7–9 (predicting that the more autonomous vehicles there are on the road, 
the more lives will be saved).
136. See supra text accompanying note 96. 
137. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 58, § 73, at 527–28 (“[L]iability is limited to the 
scope of the consent given . . . .”).
138. CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750(a)(1) (West 2015) (defining “autonomous technology”). 
139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“An employer 
is subject to liability for torts committed by employees while acting within the scope of their 
employment.”).
140. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 114, at 755–56 (explaining that employers can 
raise prices to spread the losses resulting from an accident, and because “no one person bears
the whole loss, the loss is not so disruptive”).
141. Vehicles depreciate by approximately ten percent the moment they are driven off
the lot.  Car Depreciation: 5 Things To Consider, CARFAX (Apr. 6, 2015), https://www.
carfax.com/guides/buying-used/what-to-consider/car-depreciation [https://perma.cc/S99B­
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Thus, the high financial burden that comes with this additional liability
will likely make it an unappealing purchase.142 
Autonomous vehicles benefit society due to their social utility.  However,
imputing additional driver-liability to the owner will not merely shift liability, 
but shift tort compensatory systems from negligence to strict liability. This
would not only be unjust, but would likely affect the sale of autonomous
vehicles, impeding innovation and restoring high accident rates.143  For 
these reasons, driver-liability should not be shifted to the vehicle owner. 
B. Shifting Liability to the Manufacturer 
The shift in responsibility from a conventional driver to the AI system 
piloting an autonomous vehicle could result in a shift in liability from the 
driver to the manufacturer.144  Products liability is a strict liability regime, 
grounded in the premise that manufacturers should be responsible for the 
safety of the products they create because manufacturers are better equipped 
to anticipate and guard against defects.145  Additionally, manufacturers are
better equipped to spread losses because they can pass on litigation costs 
to consumers by raising the price of their products.146  As such, this doctrine
serves as an incentive for manufacturers to create safer products.147 
In a products liability suit, a product is defective when it contains (1) a 
manufacturing defect, (2) a design defect, or (3) is defective because of
2MKB].  “On average, a new car will lose [sixty] percent of its total value over the first five
years of its life.” Id.
 142. See supra text accompanying note 116. 
143. The DOT reported highway motor vehicle fatalities increased by 7.2%, from 
32,744 to 35,092, in 2015.  TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 83, 
at 140 & tbl.6-1.  Additionally, injuries resulting from highway motor vehicle accidents 
increased by an estimated 4.5%, from 2.33 million to 2.42 million. Id. at 140–41. Furthermore, 
“[m]otor vehicle crashes continue to be the leading cause of death for teens aged [sixteen]
to [twenty] years.”  Id. at 144. 
144. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 118. 
145. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440–41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, 
J., concurring) (stating that manufacturers are better equipped to “anticipate some hazards
and guard against the recurrence of others”).
146. Id. at 441 (“[T]he risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed
among the public as a cost of doing business.”).  Although loss spreading was not Justice 
Traynor’s main goal, the concept that manufacturers are the cheapest cost avoiders was 
made popular through his opinion in Escola, and then adopted in Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Products, Inc. See 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963); Strict Products Liability to the Bystander: A
Study in Common Law Determinism, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 636 n.66 (1971). 
147. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 121. 
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inadequate instructions or warnings.148  Manufacturing defects are implicated
when the product that caused the injury was an anomalous product that deviated 
from the intended design, and as such, did not meet the manufacturer’s 
specifications and standards.149  Design defects are implicated when the
risks of the design are foreseeable and “could have been reduced or 
avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design.”150  The consumer-
expectation test and the risk-utility test are used to determine design
defects—a design is defective if it either violates the minimum safety
expectations of an ordinary consumer, or contains dangers that outweigh 
its benefits.151  A claim for failure to warn is based on a manufacturer’s
duty to provide instruction about how the product can be safely used, and
to warn consumers of the dangers inherent to that product.152 
If an autonomous vehicle is defective, then the normal rules of products 
liability should still apply because it incentivizes manufacturers to invest 
in precautions, producing better and safer vehicles.  The issue arises when 
driver-liability is shifted to the manufacturer, making the manufacturer
responsible for the defective product, and every choice the autonomous
vehicle makes.153 
First, if the manufacturer were held liable for driver decisions, it likely 
could not be done through the products liability doctrine because products 
“are by definition tangible―intangible products do not generally give rise 
148. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1998); see,
e.g., Watson v. Ford Motor Co., 699 S.E.2d 169, 174 (S.C. 2010). 
149. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(a) (“[A product] contains a 
manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended design even though all 
possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product.”); see, e.g., 
Escola, 150 P.2d at 440. 
150. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (“[A product] is defective . . . 
when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided
by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design . . . and the omission of the alternative 
design renders the product not reasonably safe.”). 
151. Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co., 901 N.E.2d 329, 352 (Ill. 2008) (“[W]e hold 
that both the consumer-expectation test and the risk-utility test continue to have their place
in our law of strict product liability based on design defect.”). 
152. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(c) (“[A product] is defective . . .
when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or 
avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings . . . and the omission of 
the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.”).
153. Elon Musk has already spoken out against additional liability stating unless it 
is design related, Tesla “won’t consider itself legally liable if its driverless cars get in a
crash.” Danielle Muoio, Elon Musk: Tesla Not Liable for Driverless Car Crashes Unless
It’s Design Related, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 19, 2016, 10:38 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ 
elon-musk-tesla-liable-driverless-car-crashes-2016-10 [https://perma.cc/4P7V-RF2S].  Musk 
likened it to getting stuck in an elevator stating, “Does the Otis Elevator Company take
responsibility for all elevators around the world, no they don’t.” Id.
856
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to product liability actions.”154  Autonomous vehicles predominantly rely
on AI to function; this is intangible software in the form of code.155  Courts
are split on whether to classify software as a product or as a service.156  As
such, unless the software malfunctions, it is unlikely that the vehicle’s driving
choices—software algorithms—will be considered a product for the purposes
of products liability law.157 
Second, imputing additional liability to the manufacturer ultimately becomes 
a barrier to the deployment of autonomous vehicles.158  Autonomous vehicles
offer enormous benefits; they not only offer the potential to drastically reduce
accidents, but also the potential to provide independence to the elderly and 
the disabled, reduce traffic congestion, provide commuters a few additional 
hours of productivity, and improve fuel efficiency while reducing carbon 
emissions.159  Therefore, attributing driver-liability to the manufacturer is
 154. Calo, supra note 46, at 535–36 (citing Nora Freeman Engstrom, 3-D Printing
and Product Liability: Identifying the Obstacles, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 35, 38–39 (2013),
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1121&context=penn_law_
review_online). 
155. See id. at 536. 
156. Different courts have taken different approaches.  For example, some courts have
determined “a program sold on a physical medium and equally available to all interested 
buyers is generally characteri[z]ed as a product.  Cloud applications, by contrast, are 
usually considered to be a service.”  Liis Vihul, The Liability of Software Manufacturers 
for Defective Products, TALLINN PAPERS, 2014, at 1, 9, https://ccdcoe.org/publications/ 
TP_Vol1No2_Vihul.pdf [https://perma.cc/MS6X-H2GE].
157. See 68 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 333 § 8, Westlaw (database updated Feb.
2017) (“Considering the way the law has developed over the course of the computer 
revolution, it seems highly unlikely that any form of strict liability will be applied to software 
in the foreseeable future . . . .”); Jeffrey K. Gurney, Sue My Car Not Me: Products Liability 
and Accidents Involving Autonomous Vehicles, 13 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 247, 259 
(2013) (“[C]ourts have not applied the manufacturing defect doctrine to software because
nothing tangible is manufactured.”); Calo, supra note 46, at 536 (“The code conveyed to 
the consumer fails to be defective for purposes of a product liability claim not because it 
lacks defects, but for the antecedent reason that it is not even a product.”); Michael D. 
Scott, Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: Has the Time Finally Come?, 67 
MD. L. REV. 425, 462 (2008) (“While a majority of courts have held that software is a 
good for the application of the U.C.C. and taxation, that does not mean that software is 
necessarily a product for the application of product liability law.” (footnotes omitted)). 
158. See Marchant & Lindor, supra note 106, at 1334 (“[E]ven though an autonomous 
vehicle may be safer overall than a conventional vehicle, it will shift the responsibility for 
accidents, and hence liability, from drivers to manufacturers.  The shift will push the manufacturer 
away from the socially-optimal outcome—to develop the autonomous vehicle.”).
159. See Cadie Thompson, 8 Ways Driverless Cars Will Drastically Improve Our 
Lives, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 10, 2015, 3:37 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/8-ways­
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worrisome because it increases the manufacturer’s risk, forcing manufacturers
to raise prices to offset liability costs.160 High prices, in turn, lead to lower 
adoption rates.161  The full benefits of autonomous vehicles will not be realized 
if they are not widely adopted.162 
Additionally, it is impractical for manufacturers to pay more for prevention 
than what the actual likelihood and severity of injury would cost them.163 
For this reason, courts employ the Learned Hand Cost-Benefit analysis to 
determine whether manufacturers have acted reasonably.164  This is an economic
formula balancing the price of safety precautions with the probability and 
severity of injury, to determine a cost-justified level of safety.165  If it is
not cost-justified—for example, if manufacturers incur more liability than 
that to which they are accustomed—there is no incentive for manufacturers 
to develop new technologies, creating a barrier to innovation.166 
This precise effect is illustrated through the pharmaceutical industry.
Prior to the adoption of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (NCVIA) 
in 1986, vaccine manufacturers were subjected to costly litigation for vaccine
driverless-cars-will-drastically-improve-our-lives-2015-12/#thousands-of-lives-will-be­
saved-each-year-1 [https://perma.cc/TA5D-C9TT]. 
160. See Marchant & Lindor, supra note 106, at 1334 (“The technology is potentially
doomed if there are a significant number of . . . cases, because the liability burden on the 
manufacturer may be prohibitive of further development.”). 
161. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 118 (“[M]anufacturers may be reluctant 
to introduce technology that will increase their liability.  Alternatively, manufacturers may
price this technology to recover their expected liability costs.  This may lead to higher prices
and lower adoption of this technology than would be socially optimal.”). 
162. See FAGNANT & KOCKELMAN, supra note 88, at 8 tbl.2. 
163. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. (Ford Pinto), 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 359, 
361–62 (Ct. App. 1981). The controversial Ford Pinto case deals with the explosion of 
Ford Pintos due to a defective fuel-system design.  See id.  Although the court found a 
design defect existed, Ford used the Hand test in determining the probability and gravity 
of the injury (death) versus the cost to fix the defect (a part costing $11) and found that 
upgrading the fuel system was not cost-justified.  Christopher Leggett, The Ford Pinto Case:
The Valuation of Life as It Applies to the Negligence-Efficiency Argument, WAKE FOREST
STUDENT, FAC., & STAFF WEB PAGES (1999), https://users.wfu.edu/palmitar/Law&Valuation/ 
Papers/1999/Leggett-pinto.html [https://perma.cc/K55T-LRSM].  There was outrage at Ford’s
quantification of human life, evident by Grimshaw’s jury award of over $2.5 million 
in compensatory damages and $125 million in punitive damages (later reduced to $3.5 
million in punitive damages). See Ford Pinto, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 358. This evaluation however,
is made every day whether it is through a court awarding damages or a business offering
danger pay.
164. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); see also
Bolton v. Stone [1951] AC 850. 
165. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 173 (reasoning that liability for negligence, due to
failure to take safety precautions, exists if the burden of taking such precautions is less
than the probability of injury multiplied by the gravity of any resulting injury, symbolized 
by B < PL = N). 
166. See Marchant & Lindor, supra note 106, at 1334. 
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injuries.167  The number of lawsuits led many pharmaceutical companies 
to stop producing vaccines, and those that remained in the industry raised
their prices to cover liability costs.168  This caused vaccine prices to “skyrocket[]
as much as 2,000 percent,” creating a health emergency.169  As a remedial
measure, Congress passed NCVIA, which acted as a tort shield limiting
manufacturer liability.170  Similarly, if courts shift driver-liability to the
manufacturer, it may open manufacturers up to substantial liability, with
the potential side effect of halting deployment and chilling innovation. 
Not only does this illustrate the barrier that liability presents to innovation, 
it also serves as another example of the legal system being outpaced by
technology.171 Additionally, how the law addresses liability issues will
significantly impact how consumers respond to autonomous vehicles, and
how these vehicles impact society. Ultimately, the benefits of autonomous
vehicles will never be realized if manufacturers are subjected to substantial 
litigation.172  Therefore, driver-liability should not be imposed on the owner
or the manufacturer. 
167. See Brandon L. Boxler, Fixing the Vaccine Act’s Structural Moral Hazard, 12 
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 6 (2012) (“As the number of government-recommended vaccines
increased in the 1970s and 1980s, so too did the number of design defect, manufacturer defect, 
and other product liability lawsuits against pharmaceutical companies.”).
168. Id. at 6–7 (first citing Charles F. Hagan, Vaccine Compensation Schemes, 45 
FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 477, 479 (1990), then citing Merrile Sing & Mary Kaye Willian,
Supplying Vaccines: An Overview of the Market and Regulatory Context, in SUPPLYING
VACCINES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL ISSUES 45, 51–52 (Mark Pauly et al. eds., 
1996)).
169. Id. at 7 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 509 (1989)). 
170. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 
3758 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(2)(A) (2012)) (“No person may
bring a civil action for damages in an amount greater than $1,000 or in an unspecified
amount against a vaccine administrator or manufacturer in a State or Federal court for
damages arising from a vaccine-related injury or death associated with the administration 
of a vaccine . . . .”).
171. See Boxler, supra note 167, at 7 (“The legal system’s failure to provide a suitable
adjudicative process for compensating vaccine injuries had created a public health emergency.”). 
172. The DOT provided an idea of what a manufacturer’s liability could amount to
when it reported that “[t]he total cost of motor vehicle crashes was estimated at $836 billion in
2010 . . . .” TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 83, at 135. 
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In 1942, science fiction writer and Professor Isaac Asimov introduced 
the “Three Laws of Robotics” as a safeguard to oversee the behavior of 
robots.173 
1.	 A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, 
allow a human being to come to harm. 
2.	 A robot must obey the orders given it by human beings except
where such orders would conflict with the First Law. 
3.	 A robot must protect its own existence as long as such
protection does not conflict with the First or Second Laws. 
In Asimov’s writings, these laws were embedded into the software,
allowing the rules to govern the robot’s behavior, making it safe.174 As
such, Asimov’s laws mandate that robots comply with “human laws and
norms” in order to coexist.175 In the case of an autonomous vehicle, human 
norms would necessitate that the vehicle obey traffic laws and regulations
so that it interacts with other vehicles and pedestrians in a safe manner.176 
To achieve this, the vehicles are programmed with a “master playbook,” 
which evaluates different “driving events,” and suggests strategies on how 
the autonomous vehicle should behave when encountering a particular 
scenario.177  These are the planning and acting portions of the vehicle’s “sense- 
plan-act” design.178  The programmer essentially hard-codes “If-Then” 
statements into the vehicle,179 enabling the driving events to cover anything 
from stopping at a red light, to passing a slow vehicle, to navigating Times 
Square.180  By doing this, the programmer, as the creator of the “master
playbook,” essentially becomes the driver. Therefore, if an accident occurs 
based on a hard-coding error, the programmer should be held liable. 
This is similar reasoning to products liability—if the coding is defective, 
then programmers should be responsible for the damage that errors in their 
173. ISAAC ASIMOV, I, ROBOT 44–45 (Bantam ed. 1991). 
174. See id. at 44 (“Now, look, let’s start with the three fundamental Rules of
Robotics—the three rules that are built most deeply into a robot’s positronic brain.”). 
175. Ronald Leenes & Federica Lucivero, Laws on Robots, Laws by Robots, Laws in 
Robots: Regulating Robot Behaviour by Design, 6 LAW INNOVATION & TECH. 193, 208
(2014) (emphasis omitted). 
176. Id.
 177. Chris Urmson et al., Autonomous Driving in Urban Environments: Boss and the 
Urban Challenge, 25 J. FIELD ROBOTICS 425, 457 (2008), http://www.fieldrobotics.org/ 
users/alonzo/pubs/papers/JFR_08_Boss.pdf [https://perma.cc/L88J-4PMZ].
178. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 58–59. 
179. Giarratana, supra note 37. 
180. See Urmson et al., supra note 177, at 457. 
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software cause.181  Additionally, this proposal makes up for the ambiguity
in the application of the products liability doctrine to software, where courts
are split on whether software algorithms are considered products or services
due to the intangible nature of software.182 
From a policy standpoint, this may be effective initially, as it serves as 
an incentive for programmers to create safer software.183  However, this
is a short-term proposal because, without delving into the specific moral
and ethical issues of programming an autonomous vehicle,184 “[t]here is
no way for [programmers] to hard-code every possible variable or situation a
car may face in a daily drive.”185  As such, AI is moving away from hard-
coding toward deep-learning.186  This is AI that programs itself by collecting 
and processing information, “learning from examples of how a system
ought to behave in response to an input,” and then acting.187  This results
in the autonomous vehicle reclaiming its position as the driver. 
181. See Jaikumar Vijayan, Hold Vendors Liable for Buggy Software, COMPUTERWORLD
(Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2550553/security0/hold-vendors­
liable-for-buggy-software.html [https://perma.cc/ZJT7-JSZA].
182. See supra Section IV.B. 
183. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 121. 
184. What happens when the “driving events” come into conflict with one another?
Especially if an autonomous vehicle does make a decision that results in less casualties, 
but regardless, is unable to avoid an accident.  For example, in the “Trolley Dilemma,” an
autonomous vehicle must choose between hitting a group of school children crossing the 
road or swerving off a cliff to avoid them, but killing the passenger.  See About the Trolley 
Dilemma, TROLLEY DILEMMA, http://www.trolleydilemma.com [https://perma.cc/A2XY­
AGR9].  How does a programmer program that choice? 
185. Giarratana, supra note 37. 
186. See Reiley, supra note 33; Brad Templeton, Comma.ai’s Quest To Build Self-
Driving Cars Better Than Google, ROBOTICS BUS. REV. (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.robotics
trends.com/article/comma_ais_quest_to_build_self_driving_cars_better_than_google 
[https://perma.cc/U26F-B446] (“Perhaps the world’s most exciting new technology today
are deep neural networks, in particular the convolutional neural networks such as ‘Deep 
Learning.’  These networks are conquering some of the most well known problems in artificial 
intelligence and pattern matching.”).
187. Reiley, supra note 33; see also Steve Crowe, How AI Is Making Self-Driving 
Cars Smarter, ROBOTICS BUS. REV. (June 14, 2016), https://www.roboticsbusinessreview. 
com/rbr/how_ai_is_making_self_driving_cars_smarter/ [https://perma.cc/Y8BG-7BKC]
(explaining “deep learning”); Giarratana, supra note 37 (emphasizing the active learning
between autonomous vehicles due to their ability to communicate); supra notes 33–37 and
accompanying text (discussing deep learning neural networks).
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If the NHTSA is willing to consider the AI system piloting an autonomous 
vehicle as the driver, why should the law not do the same?188  As negligence
mandates, a driver must act, or fail to act, as a reasonably prudent person
would in order to be found liable.189  In the case of an autonomous vehicle, 
the traditional driver is removed from the equation altogether.  However, 
this does not mean that driver liability should be discarded.  In fact, this 
section proposes that liability be attributed to the driver, with the driver 
being the autonomous vehicle itself. 
A. Corporations and Legal Personhood
The law is familiar with, and has long addressed issues relating to the 
control and responsibility divided among human and non-human actors, 
with the most instructive model being a corporation.190  In the United States, a
corporation is considered a legal person in the eyes of the law.191  A legal
person is defined as an entity “given certain legal rights and duties of a 
human being.”192  These rights and duties allow corporations to enter into 
contracts, buy and sell property, and sue and be sued.193  Most notably,
however, corporate personhood allows a corporation to be separate and 
distinct from its shareholders.194  This in turn enables a corporation to act 
as a liability shield, protecting its shareholders from personal liability for
 188. See Letter from Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, supra note 9. 
189. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 284 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
190. Smith, supra note 54, at 423. 
191. See, e.g., Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).  Prior 
to the oral argument, Chief Justice Waite stated the court ”does not wish to hear argument 
on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution,
which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws, applies to these corporations.  We are all of opinion that it does.” Id.  The legal
personhood of corporations was taken one step further by the 2010 Supreme Court 
decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, which gave corporations the
First Amendment right to free speech. Lisa McElroy, Citizens United v. FEC in Plain English,
SCOTUS BLOG (Jan. 22, 2010, 11:45 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/citizens­
united-v-fec-in-plain-english/ [https://perma.cc/G8WJ-SC6W].  Additionally, in Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Supreme Court held that corporations were “persons” under
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, giving corporations the First Amendment right to
freedom of religion.  134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014). 
192. Legal Person, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
193. Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 
1629, 1638 (2011); Alexis Dyschkant, Note, Legal Personhood: How We Are Getting It Wrong, 
2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 2075, 2084; Corporations, US LEGAL, https://uslegal.com/corporations/
[https://perma.cc/V3GA-MFXQ].
194. Pollman, supra note 193, at 1638–39. 
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any actions of the corporation.195  As such, a corporation is a legal construct, 
an artificial person, that takes the form of a human being for liability
purposes.196 
Corporations are not the only nonhuman entities attributed with legal 
personhood.  In New Zealand, a dispute between the government and the 
Māori over the ownership of the Te Urewera National Park resulted in the 
Te Urewera Act, which declared the national park a legal entity with “all
the rights, powers, duties and liabilities of a legal person.”197  A similar dispute
over the Whanganui River resulted in the Te Awa Tupua Act, which recognized
the river as a tribal ancestor, and granted it the “same legal rights as a
human being.”198 Similarly, in 2013, India announced that dolphins should 
be seen as nonhuman persons, with the specific right to be left alone.199 
As a result of this recognition, India completely banned dolphinariums 
and the use of dolphins for public entertainment.200 
While India and New Zealand are assigning legal personhood to natural
lands, rivers, and animals, the European Parliament Committee on Legal 
195. Corporations, supra note 193. 
196. Chief Justice Marshall defined a corporation as “an artificial being, invisible, 
intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.”  Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (emphasis added). 
197. Te Urewera Act 2014, s 11 (N.Z.), http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2014/ 
0051/latest/DLM6183601.html [https://perma.cc/QNN5-8Y7P].  Under the Act, a Board,
made up of Māori and Crown representatives, is charged with managing the 821-square­
mile park. Id. s 16; Bryant Rousseau, In New Zealand, Lands and Rivers Can Be People 
(Legally Speaking), N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/14/ 
world/what-in-the-world/in-new-zealand-lands-and-rivers-can-be-people-legally-speaking.html. 
198. Eleanor Ainge Roy, New Zealand River Granted Same Legal Rights as Human 
Being, GUARDIAN (Mar. 16, 2017, 12:50 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/ 
mar/16/new-zealand-river-granted-same-legal-rights-as-human-being [https://perma.cc/
KD7W-D43X ] (“The new status of the river means if someone abused or harmed it the 
law now sees no differentiation between harming the tribe or harming the river because they
are one and the same.”); Te Awa Tupua Act 2017, s 14 (N.Z.), http://www.legislation.govt.nz/ 
act/public/2017/0007/latest/whole.html [https://perma.cc/DT8D-VTBJ].
199. See India Declares Dolphins “Non-Human Persons”—Dolphin Shows Banned, 
TRANSCEND MEDIA SERV., (Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.transcend.org/tms/2015/12/india­
declares-dolphins-non-human-persons-dolphin-shows-banned/ [https://perma.cc/3WHD­
GRWQ] (explaining that dolphins are viewed as “highly intelligent and sensitive” and 
therefore their “life and liberty must be respected”).
200. See India Just Banned the Use of Dolphins and Orcas for Public Entertainment, 
UNDERGROUND REP. (June 29, 2016), http://undergroundreporter.org/india-banned­
dolphins-entertainment/ [https://perma.cc/5LNG-WS2A] (reporting that Dolphinariums and 
the capture and confinement of cetacean species, such as whales and dolphins, for public
entertainment is completely banned).
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Affairs has approved a draft report proposing to classify sophisticated
autonomous robots as “electronic persons with specific rights and
obligations.”201  The report recommends the establishment of a compulsory 
insurance scheme where, like cars, “producers or owners of robots would
be required to take out insurance cover for the damage potentially caused
by their robots.”202  If the damage is not covered by insurance, the report
proposes the creation of a compensation fund, which would cover liability
and serve as a depository for payments made to autonomous robots for their 
services.203 The fund would be governed by a register, whereby a registration 
number would link each autonomous robot to its fund.204  This report
establishes a legal framework for “electronic persons,” thereby substantiating 
the premise that giving a legal status to an autonomous vehicle is no longer 
considered science fiction; instead it is modern reality. 
B. Insurance 
A common way for corporations to manage risk is to buy insurance.
However, driverless technology will have a large impact on the insurance 
industry because the safer the vehicle, the more insurance premiums are 
anticipated to decline.205  In 2015, car insurers brought in 200 billion dollars’
worth of premiums.206  As autonomous technology becomes mainstream,
insurance companies estimate up to an eighty percent decline, creating a major
disruption in the auto insurance market.207  Deloitte forecasts “approximately 
201. Mady Delvaux (Rapporteur), Comm. on Legal Affairs, European Parliament, Draft 
Report with Recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, at 6,
11–1, 2015/2103(INL) (May 31, 2016), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pub
Ref=-//EP//NONSGML%2BCOMPARL%2BPE-582.443%2B01%2BDOC%2BPDF%2B 
V0//EN [https://perma.cc/P4UR-CAPG]; European Parliament Press Release, Robots: 
Legal Affairs Committee calls for EU-wide rules (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.europarl. 
europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=IM-PRESS&reference=20170110IPR57613&language=EN& 
format=pdf [https://perma.cc/AD7K-AA27] (“[The draft report was] approved by 17 votes 
to 2, with 2 abstentions . . . .”).
notes the automobile insurance industry will change with the introduction of autonomous 
202. Id. at 11. 
203. Id.
 204. Id. at 11–12. 
205. See MARKETPLACE OF CHANGE, supra note 121, at 25–26, 30.  In its survey, KMPG
vehicles, and “[t]he magnitude of change will be historic—perhaps the biggest change 
since the introduction of automobiles themselves a century ago.”  Id. at 37. 
206. Leslie Scism, Driverless Cars Threaten To Crash Insurers’ Earnings, WALL STREET 
J. (July 26, 2016, 11:04 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/driverless-cars-threaten-to-crash­
insurers-earnings-1469542958. 
207. Id.; see also MARKETPLACE OF CHANGE, supra note 121, at 25 (explaining that 
based on actuarial models, KPMG predicts “[a]ccident frequency could drop by [eighty]
percent”).
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$200 billion in personal-car-insurance premiums to hold steady for seven 
or eight years, then slide to about $40 billion by 2040.”208 
Currently, actuaries determine insurance rates by predicting the “likelihood
that accidents will happen” based on statistics such as age, driving history,
and even the crash rates between male and female drivers.209  However, 
in the future, actuaries will have to replace calculations about individuals 
with technology-based calculations, such as how advanced the AI system 
piloting the vehicle is, which “parts of the country have better satellite 
imagery,” and how vulnerable the vehicle is to hacking.210 While autonomous 
vehicles are expected to be safer, there will still be accidents, and insurance 
is often the last line of defense when it comes to the risks involved with 
new technology.211  Thus, insurance companies will be forced to adapt their 
policy coverage as risk and liability change.212 
Insurance is a complex industry, and a full analysis of the industry goes 
beyond the scope of this Comment.  However, one insurance model that 
legal scholars have proposed for autonomous vehicles is no-fault insurance.
No-fault insurance is a liability system whereby an accident victim can
receive compensation directly from their “own insurance company instead
of having to show the fault of another driver to recover losses from [that]
driver’s insurance company.”213  Although a system that does not require
 208. Scism, supra note 206.  Similarly, KPMG reports that the personal auto sector 
currently “accounts for roughly $125 billion in loss costs.  By 2040, [KPMG] believe[s] this 
sector could cover less than $50 billion in loss costs.” MARKETPLACE OF CHANGE, supra
note 121, at 29. 
209. Scism, supra note 206. 
210. Id.
 211. Julia Eddington, How Will Driverless Cars Impact Auto Insurance?, QUOTED (June 
23, 2016), https://www.thezebra.com/insurance-news/3069/insurance-for-driverless-cars/
[https://perma.cc/EF7F-N98N].
212. See id.  This adaptation has already started in the United Kingdom, where insurance
company Adrian Flux has launched the first auto insurance policy for autonomous vehicles.
See Julia Kollewe, Insurer Launches UK’s ‘First Driverless Car Policy,’ GUARDIAN (June
7, 2016, 11:42 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jun/07/uk-driverless­
car-insurance-policy-adrian-flux [https://perma.cc/Z4LE-M5FL].  However, the policy currently
only covers semi-autonomous vehicles—those fitted with assistive technology, such as 
autonomous braking—and will be updated as both liability and driverless technology
evolve. Id.  Conversely, in the United States, KPMG reported that less than ten percent of
its survey respondents, made up of insurance company senior executives, have acted to
adequately prepare their business models for this change.  MARKETPLACE OF CHANGE, supra
note 121, at 20, 34. 
213. Laura Zakaras, What Happened to No-Fault Automobile Insurance?, RAND
CORP. (2010), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9505/index1.html [https://perma.cc/ 
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fault may seem like a viable solution for autonomous vehicle liability,
over the last thirty years, “efforts to pass federal legislation [have] stalled,” 
and most states have “repealed their no-fault laws and [have] gone back
to the traditional tort system.”214  In fact, of the twenty-five states that 
initially passed some form of no-fault insurance, only twelve states still offer 
it.215  This is largely because the no-fault system became significantly more
expensive than the tort system due to substantially higher medical costs, 
which in turn resulted in high liability premiums.216  This decline in popularity
also stems from the fact that no-fault insurance eliminates the right to full 
compensation, deprives consumers of the leverage of adequate legal remedies, 
and has not proven to reduce disputes and litigation.217  Additionally, within 
8ARG-H346].  In the 1970s, prompted by the dissatisfaction with the traditional tort system, 
many insurers and consumer groups supported no-fault insurance.  Id. They viewed it as
a way to “mitigate the problems of resolving disputes through the courts, such as high costs, 
long delays . . . and the unfairness of compensating some victims much more than others.” 
Id.  Ultimately, the no-fault system was “intended to lower the cost of auto insurance by
taking small claims out of the courts.”  No-Fault Auto Insurance, INS. INFO. INST. (Feb. 3,
2014), http://www.iii.org/issue-update/no-fault-auto-insurance [https://perma.cc/3HNQ­
3ZV6].
214. Zakaras, supra note 213. 
215. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 113; JAMES M. ANDERSON ET AL., THE U.S.
EXPERIENCE WITHNO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE:ARETROSPECTIVE 2–3 (2010) [hereinafter
ANDERSON ET AL., A RETROSPECTIVE], https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG860.html. 
These twelve states include: Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Utah. No-Fault Auto 
Insurance, supra note 213. 
216. See ANDERSON ET AL., A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 215, at 3, 144.  As soon as
no-fault insurance was repealed in Georgia, Connecticut, and Colorado “the price of 
liability premiums dropped by [ten] to [thirty] percent in all three states.” Zakaras, supra
note 213; see also  ANDERSON ET AL., A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 215, at 74–75 
(documenting the “pattern of substantial cost decreases in all three states following the 
repeal of no-fault”).  This is partly because “in no-fault states, auto insurance almost
certainly pays for a larger proportion of auto accident-related medical costs than in tort
states, where first-party medical insurance pays for a higher proportion.” ANDERSON ET
AL., A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 215, at 119.  It is also because, no-fault insurance “pays 
a much higher percentage of billed medical costs than medical insurance . . . .  Thus, 
medical providers [are] much more likely to initially bill no-fault insurance prior to 
seeking recovery against the victim’s medical insurance.” Id. (footnotes omitted). This 
might change if auto-insurers begin negotiating rate agreements with health care providers.
However, up to this point, negotiations of this kind are not standard practice.
217. See A Failed Experiment: Analysis and Evaluation of No-Fault Laws, FOUND.
FOR TAXPAYER & CONSUMER RTS., http://mail.consumerwatchdog.org/insurance/fs/fs000 
218.php3 [https://perma.cc/YSX2-FF6D]; see also ANDERSON ET AL., ARETROSPECTIVE, supra
note 215, at 92–97 (“[W]hile auto cases represent a smaller proportion of cases actually
reaching trial in no-fault states, attorney involvement in cases has increased modestly over
time in no-fault . . . states relative to tort states, and total auto litigation volume has become
more comparable between tort and no-fault states.”), 115 (explaining that a major limitation of
the no-fault system is the “denial of compensation for noneconomic losses [such as pain and
suffering] to those whose injuries fall below the recovery threshold”). 
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the states that still offer no-fault insurance, there is a “threshold”—if injuries 
reach a certain degree of severity, the tort system is reinstated, and automobile 
crash victims are permitted to sue other drivers.218  Furthermore, evidence
suggests that “a system that allows drivers to choose between no-fault and
tort insurance may function better than conventional no-fault.”219  Seeing 
that the recurring trend is to maintain a tort system, this insurance model
does nothing to fill the gap in the tort framework created by autonomous 
vehicles, especially if crashes result in severe injuries.  Therefore, no-fault 
insurance alone is likely not a viable solution for autonomous vehicle 
liability.220 
Conversely, self-insurance, similar to the compensation fund proposed 
by the European Parliament Committee, may prove to be such a solution.221 
Self-insurance and traditional insurance “are two different methods of 
treating risks.”222 Self-insurance refers to an employer’s assumption of the
risks associated with insurance coverage, whereas traditional insurance 
transfers that risk to a third party insurance company.223  Therefore, self-
insurance requires that employers set money aside specifically for losses,
as opposed to paying that money, in the form of monthly premium payments, 
218. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 113.  “Drivers in no-fault states may sue 
for severe injuries if the case meets certain conditions.  These conditions are known as the 
tort liability threshold and may be expressed in verbal terms such as death or significant
disfigurement (verbal threshold) or in dollar amounts of medical bills (monetary threshold).”
No-Fault Auto Insurance, supra note 213.
 219. Zakaras, supra note 213; see also ANDERSON ET AL., A RETROSPECTIVE, supra
note 215, at 59–60, 137 (explaining that “there seems to be substantial consumer support
for choice no-fault” with choice no-fault likely remaining “the form of no-fault that is most 
politically attractive”).
220. Although the RAND report states that technological innovation, such as autonomous 
vehicle technology, may make no-fault systems more desirable in the future, it also states 
that this technology may “change the distribution of accidents,” where “[p]resently, minor 
accidents vastly outnumber the major ones.”  ANDERSON ET AL., A RETROSPECTIVE, supra
note 215, at 142.  By reducing human error, “autonomous-vehicle technology may be remarkably
effective at virtually eliminating minor accidents.  But it may be that the few accidents that
remain are the result of software failures and could be catastrophic.”  Id. at 141–42.  Seeing
that no-fault insurance was meant to keep small claims out of the courts, it would be
ineffective in dealing with claims associated with these catastrophic accidents because
victims would revert to the tort system.  See supra text accompanying notes 213, 218. 
221. See supra Section VI.A. 
222. Robert Allan Naeve, Comment, Motor Vehicle Liability Self-Insurance: The Coverage 
Gap, 13 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 205, 205 (1979). 
223. Christina H. Park, Prevalence of Employer Self-Insured Health Benefits: National 
and State Variation, 57 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 340, 341 (2000). 
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to an insurance company.224  As premiums associated with commercial 
insurance continue to rise, more companies are moving toward self-insurance,
with the most popular form of self-insurance being medical insurance for 
employees.225 This structure is attractive to employers because they do 
not pay for care “employees might receive; they pay only to cover the care
employees actually receive.”226  Additionally, although the employer retains 
the risk, it can be limited with stop-loss coverage, which protects companies 
from large or unexpected claims.227 
Ultimately, the benefits of self-insurance include the ability to manage 
risk through greater control over funds and claims, the opportunity to earn 
interest on reserve funds thereby improving cash flow, and the ability to 
keep, and save, all monies resulting from unspent claims.228  In fact, with
the introduction of the Affordable Care Act, many companies have opted
to self-insure employee health care plans in order to “cope with the uncertainties 
created by the new law.”229  As society finds itself in a similarly uncertain 
situation with regard to the regulation of—and laws surrounding—autonomous
vehicles, self-insurance becomes an appealing model. 
C. Holding the Autonomous Vehicle Liable 
Autonomous vehicles will likely be introduced gradually through ride-
sharing services such as Uber and Lyft, and act as taxis.230  Therefore, one
 224. Id.; see also How Do Self-Insured Plans Work and How Are They Different Than
Traditional Health Insurance Plans?, SELF-INS. EDUC. FOUND., http://www.siefonline.org/
participants.php [https://perma.cc/E362-T78F] (explaining how self-insurance plans work, and
who pays for what); Self-Insurance, INT’L RISK MGMT. INST., https://www.irmi.com/online/
insurance-glossary/terms/s/self-insurance.aspx [https://perma.cc/BP4V-VWHA] (defining
“self-insurance”).
225. See Robert Pear, Some Employers Could Opt Out of Insurance Market, Raising
Others’ Costs, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/18/us/allure-of­
self-insurance-draws-concern-over-costs.html?_r=0.
 226. Rosland Briggs Gammon, Self-Funded Health Care Could Lower Costs, MILWAUKEE
BUS. J. (Feb. 26, 2016, 11:00 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/milwaukee/stories/2006/ 
02/27/focus4.html [https://perma.cc/RLL6-G49C]. 
227. Self-Insured Businesses Increasingly Turn To Stop Loss Coverage, PARTNERRE
(June 15, 2015), http://www.partnerre.com/opinions-research/self-insured-businesses­
increasingly-turn-to-stop-loss-coverage#.WKokuhjMzMU [https://perma.cc/DTR7-SRTN].
228. Specific Advantages of Self-Insurance, SELF-INS. EDUC. FOUND., http://www.
siefonline.org/employers.php [https://perma.cc/4PE3-PPQG].
229. Pear, supra note 225. 
230. See Anthony Levandowski, Pittsburgh, Your Self-Driving Uber Is Arriving Now, 
UBER NEWSROOM (Sept. 14, 2016), https://newsroom.uber.com/pittsburgh-self-driving­
uber/ [https://perma.cc/QW2Z-3PK7] (announcing that self-driving Ubers are on the road 
in Pittsburgh); see also Luís Bettencourt, These Cities Could Lead the Driverless Car 
Revolution, FORTUNE (Oct. 4, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/10/04/driverless-cars-uber­
lyft-google-baidu/ [https://perma.cc/TY5J-J99J] (identifying autonomous vehicles as
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initial possibility is to require the cars to be exclusively ride-share vehicles, 
and pool the liability costs.  In this scenario, ride-share companies would 
no longer have the expense of a driver, allowing the companies to reallocate 
those funds to a liability reserve.231  Alternatively, by slightly raising the
price of each individual ride, the ride-share company could effectively spread
the losses associated with liability by distributing them among the ride-
share users.232 However, ride-sharing is not a long-term solution because 
it is inevitable that autonomous vehicles will be privately owned.233  In fact, 
Michigan made history in December 2016 by becoming the first state to
“establish regulations for the testing, use, and eventual sale of self-driving 
cars.”234 
This evolution from driver-operated to fully autonomous will substantially 
impact liability, specifically in who pays what and when. Instead of expanding 
the source of potentially liable parties, the law should direct its attention
to the responsible party.  For this reason, this Comment proposes that an
autonomous vehicle should, like a corporation, be considered a legal person, 
with the same rights and duties as a human being.235 States are instinctively 
moving in this direction; for example, an early draft of Nevada’s regulation
effectively assigned legal personhood to fully autonomous vehicles, by
granting “the autonomous technology . . . all of the rights and . . . all of the 
duties applicable to the driver.”236  This legal status would enable the
a new form of public transportation, with cities such as Beijing and Helsinki already using 
these vehicles in autonomous bussing and taxi services). 
231. See Eric Newcomer, Uber Loses at Least $1.2 Billion in First Half of 2016, 
BLOOMBERG QUINT (Aug. 25, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloombergquint.com/business/
2016/08/25/uber-loses-at-least-1-2-billion-in-first-half-of-2016 [https://perma.cc/CQC6­
Y8MX] (“Subsidies for Uber’s drivers are responsible for the majority of the company’s 
losses.”). 
232. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 114, at 756. 
233. Elon Musk’s “shared fleet” business model is structured for autonomous Tesla’s to
be privately owned. See Elon Musk, Master Plan, Part Deux, TESLA (July 20, 2016), https:// 
www.tesla.com/blog/master-plan-part-deux [https://perma.cc/JQ8K-5ZRE].  Once Teslas 
are fully autonomous, Tesla owners can “add [their] car to the Tesla shared fleet just by
tapping a button on the Tesla phone app and have it generate income for [the owner] while 
[they are] at work or on vacation.” Id.  Musk noted that this will “dramatically lower[] the 
true cost of ownership to the point where almost anyone could own a Tesla.”  Id.
 234. Danielle Muoio, The State of Michigan Just Made Self-Driving-Car History, 
BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 9, 2016, 11:02 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/driverless-car­
regulations-michigan-2016-12 [https://perma.cc/R2AT-MQY7].
235. See supra Section VI.A. 
236. Smith, supra note 54, at 479.
 869
























   




    





    
autonomous vehicle to sue and be sued in the case of an accident.237  Most
importantly, it would place liability on the autonomous vehicle as opposed 
to shifting driver liability to the owner, manufacturer, or programmer, thereby 
shielding these parties from unnecessary litigation.238  This would in turn
reflect positively on the autonomous vehicle industry by removing additional
barriers to deployment and encouraging innovation.239 
In modeling this structure on the corporation, the owner of the vehicle 
would take the role of the shareholder, and therefore would own one hundred 
percent of the “shares” in the vehicle.  As such, the owner would gain the 
protection of limited liability in the case of an accident.240  However, corporations
have directors responsible for ensuring the corporation complies with
legislation. This responsibility places a fiduciary duty on the director, so 
if compliance is not met, the director himself can be sued.241  In the
autonomous vehicle sector, compliance could take the form of ensuring 
the vehicle’s technology is up-to-date, is regularly serviced, and complies 
with road safety standards. 
Additionally, the DMV already has procedures in place to add a corporation 
to a vehicle title, thereby registering the vehicle in the name of the corporation.242 
However, under this proposal, the vehicle is the corporation.  This classification 
might require the DMV to alter its current procedures by recording a 
shareholder and a director when registering the autonomous vehicle.243  In
a corporation, a shareholder can also be the director.244  Therefore, the owner 
of the vehicle may appoint himself as the director.  In a family scenario, 
an adult or parent could be the shareholder and director, or, in the case of
a teenager owning the vehicle, the parent may be assigned as the director,
and the teenager could be assigned as the shareholder.  To facilitate this 
237. See supra Section VI.A. 
238. See supra Part IV and Section VI.A.
 239. See supra Section IV.B. 
240. See supra Section VI.A; see also Pollman, supra note 193, at 1637–38 (discussing
the protections afforded by the corporate form). 
241. See generally Cleaveland D. Miller, The Fiduciary Duties of a Corporate Director, 
4 U. BALT. L. REV. 259 (1975). 
242. See Janet Hunt, Adding a Corporation to a Vehicle Title, HOUS. CHRON., http:// 
smallbusiness.chron.com/adding-corporation-vehicle-title-37927.html [https://perma.cc/BY6F- 
PZQV] (explaining that a vehicle can be “registered in the name of the corporation”).
243. Each state has its own procedures and requirements for registering a vehicle to 
a corporation. Id.  California’s application for title or registration currently includes information
fields for the “owner” and “legal owner.”  CAL.DEP’T OFMOTOR VEHICLES, REG.343APPLICATION 
FOR TITLE OR REGISTRATION (2012), https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/wcm/connect/8c4e5fdb­
a44e-44f6-853b-eabd471afdaa/reg343.pdf?MOD=AJPERES [https://perma.cc/9ABH-LH7V].
244. Shareholder, LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com/knowledge/corporation/topic/ 
what-is-a-corporation-shareholder [https://perma.cc/38PD-DZRJ] (“In many small corporations,
the shareholders act as the officers and directors . . . .”).
870
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corporate structure, the shares should be fully transferable so that when the
vehicle is sold, the shares will be transferred to the new owner.
If the owner and manufacturer are shielded from additional liability, the 
question then becomes: who pays?  One way to implement this structure
is to create a reserve fund through a liability surcharge or tax, analogous 
to a self-insurance fund.245  Monies can be collected in multiple ways, such
as part of the vehicle’s purchase price, and through taxes imposed on the 
manufacturer.246  What is important is that both the owner and manufacturer
contribute to the fund.  Through this contribution, both parties will be
incentivized to maintain the safe production and operation of the vehicle. 
Additionally, this form of collective action provides a means of spreading 
losses through the autonomous vehicle industry, as opposed to having the 
loss fall on one party.247  While the cost of liability effectively trickles down 
into the price of the new car, the surcharge will likely be less than an individual 
driver-operated insurance policy because the risks will be less—driverless
cars result in fewer accidents, thus less liability.248 
This fund could be administrated by the federal government, the autonomous 
vehicle industry, or even the insurance industry through adapted insurance 
policies.249  Due to the different technologies employed by different companies,
the administrator could partition the fund, making claims manufacturer­
specific.250  This would ensure that manufacturers remain incentivized to 
produce better and safer vehicles, while preventing one company from
depleting the reserve fund. 
Additionally, all newly manufactured passenger vehicles would be required 
to have event data recorders (EDR) on board.  The Federal Automated
Vehicles Policy also specifically encourages the installation of EDR’s in 
245. See supra Section VI.B. 
246. See James F. Peltz, Self-Driving Cars Could Flip the Auto Insurance Industry 
on Its Head, L.A. TIMES (June 20, 2016, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la­
fi-agenda-driverless-insurance-20160620-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/MB22-XZFX]
(“[Manufacturers] might even add the insurance premium to the sticker price of new cars.”).
247. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 114, at 755–56 (reasoning that the loss is then “not
so disruptive”).
248. See supra Section VI.B. 
249. There may also be an option for the state to oversee the fund; however, the risk 
may be high, and states that involve themselves in private enterprise put tax payers’ money
at risk.
250. In this scenario, two autonomous vehicles have crashed into one another, one 
owned by Google and the other owned by Tesla.  If the event data recorder determines that 
Tesla was at fault, then the Google car could sue the Tesla car and claim from Tesla’s portion 
of the reserve fund. 
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autonomous vehicles.251 These recorders, otherwise known as black boxes, 
“retroactively map out the details of each crash or traffic incident,” reconstructing
the accident, and limiting the need for outside investigations.252  Through 
the EDR, the autonomous vehicle can retain “a record of relevant decisions 
it made.”253  In the event of an accident, the administrator can review the
data to determine if the autonomous vehicle is at fault, and if so, which 
manufacturer-specific fund to debit.
Therefore, as a corporation, the autonomous vehicle can be sued for any 
accident caused by the AI, shielding owners and manufacturers from additional 
liability.  The victim can claim from the reserve fund, and the event data 
recorders can provide evidence of liability. 
VII. CONCLUSION
The goal of tort law is to hold that which is responsible liable.254 It 
follows then that when an autonomous vehicle is responsible, it should be
held liable. The current tort liability framework is inadequate to support 
fully autonomous vehicles because it shifts liability to the owner or
manufacturer, as opposed to holding the AI system liable for its driving choices.
Autonomous vehicles must evolve from being classified as products to 
being classified as legal entities—artificial persons—possessing the legal
rights and duties of a corporation. The Federal Automated Vehicles Policy
encourages states to implement consistent policies regarding autonomous 
vehicles because of the countrywide impact they will have.255  By legally 
defining the autonomous vehicle as an artificial person, and holding that
autonomous vehicle liable through the aid of a reserve fund, the law would
be providing a definitive and uniform liability plan.  This Comment initially
 251. See FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES POLICY, supra note 54, at 80–81 (noting 
that the “NHTSA currently has authority to [implement EDR’s]”); see also Kristen Hall-
Geisler, The Importance of Black Boxes in an Autonomous Automotive Future, TECHCRUNCH
(May 13, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/05/13/the-importance-of-black-boxes-in­
an-autonomous-automotive-future/ [https://perma.cc/ZWN6-TB5S].  Senate Bill 1813 
passed in 2012, mandating the instillation of event data recorders on all newly manufactured
passenger-vehicles sold after 2015.  S. 1813, 112th Cong. § 31406 (as passed by the Senate,
Mar. 14, 2012).  Although the Senate’s EDR provisions did not pass in the House
of Representatives, the Bill supports the NHTSA’s move toward requiring this technology.
See id.; see also Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 112-141, 
126 Stat. 405 (2012). 
252. Eddington, supra note 211. 
253. FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES POLICY, supra note 54, at 80. 
254. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 58, § 1, at 7. 
255. See FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES POLICY, supra note 54, at 7; see also
Encouraging the Safe and Responsible Deployment of Automated Vehicles, supra note 79
(noting that one of the goals of the Federal Automated Vehicles Policy is to generate “a
consistent national framework for the testing and operation of automated vehicles”). 
872
SELLWOOD (DO NOT DELETE) 8/14/2018 2:20 PM     
   





[VOL. 54:  829, 2017] The Road to Autonomy
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
posed the question, “Should an autonomous robot possess a legal status in 
society?” and through this road to autonomy, it has answered that question
in the affirmative, thereby holding the autonomous vehicle liable. 
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